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Since the term gentrification was first coined in the 1960s, scholars have had an 
interest in understanding how this process of change can impact neighborhoods.  
Empirical research focusing on the relationship between gentrification and crime has 
yielded varying results, with little examination of the contextual mechanisms which may 
influence the relationship.  In addition, little empirical attention has been devoted to the 
possibility of the spatial displacement of crime due to gentrification.  The purpose of this 
dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of how gentrification impacts levels of 
crime in three ways.  First, using data from the U.S. Census, the Project on Human 
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, and the Chicago Transit Authority, I examine 
whether gentrification is significantly associated with lower levels of crime.  Second, I 
examine levels of crime in gentrifying and adjacent areas to assess the presence of spatial 
displacement.  Third, I incorporate two contextual factors – collective efficacy and 
perceived neighborhood change – to examine whether or not they modify the relationship 
between gentrification and crime.  Analyses utilize multilevel modeling techniques and 
difference-in-differences estimation.  Results offer preliminary support for the 
 
 
moderating roles of collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood change mechanisms 
on the relationship between gentrification and crime.  While there is an overall negative 
association between gentrification and crime, this effect is strengthened with collective 
efficacy, but reversed with rising levels of perceived neighborhood change.  Additionally, 
there is preliminary evidence that the spatial displacement of crime is not occurring as a 
result of gentrification.  I conclude this dissertation with a discussion of the limitations, 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
Gentrification is a process that has the potential to impact the appearance, 
population characteristics, commercial business, and culture of a neighborhood.  It is a 
process that involves capital investment, local politics, and is often accompanied by 
citizens voicing both their support and protest of the changes.  This dissertation aims to 
investigate whether gentrification processes are associated with levels of crime in 
neighborhoods.  By examining this phenomenon through the lens of neighborhood social 
control and perceived neighborhood change, the current project attempts to give the study 
of gentrification and crime a firm foundation within criminological theory. 
Concern over neighborhood conditions and their impact on crime is not a new 
phenomenon.  Since the pioneering work of human ecologists at the University of 
Chicago (Park, 1936), and Shaw and McKay’s (1942) explanation of stable levels of 
crime in areas with social disorganization, criminologists have demonstrated that 
neighborhoods unable to exercise social control often maintain the highest levels of crime 
(Sampson and Groves, 1989).  However, critics of some of the earliest social 
disorganization research cited the theory’s inability to pinpoint and measure the actual 
causal mechanisms of control within a community (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978).  
Responding to these criticisms, systemic models of social control (Bursik and Grasmick, 
1993; Sampson and Groves, 1989) have been developed, and Sampson and colleagues 
have explored the concept of neighborhood collective efficacy and its impact on crime 
(Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson, 2012; Sampson et al., 1997; 
Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). 
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However, research on neighborhood-level explanations of crime typically 
operates under the assumption that neighborhoods with high crime do not see much 
change in their demographic or economic conditions over time.  Indeed, many studies 
collect data on neighborhood-level conditions at the outset, and do not account for the 
possibility that these conditions might change over time (Sampson, 2012).  The causal 
mechanisms in models of collective efficacy and neighborhood control are not the 
structural characteristics of neighborhoods, but all neighborhood-level models specify 
that it is impossible to separate mechanisms such as collective efficacy, private, 
parochial, or public social control from the neighborhood conditions that influence their 
development (Sampson, 2012).  Therefore, while criminologists are developing a 
growing understanding of how mechanisms such as collective efficacy operate in 
historically disadvantaged, heterogeneous communities, it is unclear how these 
mechanisms will operate in such communities as they are undergoing change.  
Gentrification, a phenomenon that has impacted many impoverished urban areas in the 
past several decades, will be the specific type of neighborhood change examined in the 
current research project. 
 The process and effects of gentrification have received attention from urban 
planners, economists, and anthropologists, but have only recently begun receiving 
attention from the field of criminology.  Perhaps this is because a clear operationalization 
of the term has yet to be agreed upon- the word itself is highly charged with sometimes 
positive or negative connotations.  In the small body of criminological research 
examining this process, results are often mixed with respect to the effect of gentrification 
on neighborhood crime.   Some scholars suggest that gentrification will lower crime in 
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the area undergoing change, with the potential for displacement effects to nearby areas 
(O’Sullivan, 2005; Papachristos et al., 2011).  Others hypothesize that crime will increase 
and speculate that this may be because gentrification undermines neighborhood cohesion 
and disrupts informal social control (McDonald, 1986; Taylor and Covington, 1988).  
Finally, there are those who are not convinced that any relationship, if it exists, is linear 
or that it occurs in the same way for all residents and in all gentrifying areas (Kreager et 
al., 2011; Van Wilsem et al., 2006).  This wide array of conflicting results suggests that 
there is still much work to be done to understand the causal processes at work; the current 
research project aims to investigate some of the possible mechanisms which may interact 
with the gentrification process to impact crime in neighborhoods. 
Gentrification is at times an extremely controversial and polarizing topic, and as 
research evidence builds surrounding its impact on crime, the policy conclusions will 
become important elements for debate.  It is not clear, for example, what one would do if 
it was proven that gentrification helps reduce crime- if gentrification is beneficial, but 
none of the long-term residents of a neighborhood are around to enjoy these benefits, can 
we conclude that the process is one to be valued and emulated?  Conversely, if 
gentrification is associated with an increase in crime, are restrictions on these projects, 
often labeled “urban revitalizations,” even practically possible?  These questions are 
difficult, but before they can be addressed it is vital that criminological research examines 
the relationship between gentrification and crime so that we can make sense of 
conflicting findings from the past and establish a solid foundation upon which to continue 
examining this process in the future.  The current project attempts to contribute to this 
body of research and move our understanding of gentrification and crime forward. 
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Statement of the Problem 
 Despite the fact that there are several famous examples of gentrification causing 
dramatic and rapid change to previously disadvantaged urban communities (Freeman, 
2006), there has been little research to discover what impact, if any, this process has had 
on crime.  This is a problem because the process of gentrification has the potential to 
change and disrupt neighborhood-level forces which have long been cited in 
criminological research as having an impact on crime.  Although a considerable body of 
research has been built examining neighborhood-level influences on crime, there are 
several important limitations of past research on gentrification.  I review four significant 
limitations here including: (1) a lack of consistency in the operationalization and 
definition of the term gentrification, (2) the treatment of neighborhood-level structural 
characteristics as static attributes, not studying how their change might impact informal 
social control, (3) exclusively using official data to measure neighborhood change, 
without attempting to also collect accounts of the gentrification process from 
neighborhoods, and (4) the absence of a theoretical framework offering testable 
mechanisms which may interact with gentrification and crime. 
 Operationalization of the Term ‘Gentrification’ 
 There has been a general lack of consistency in the operationalization and 
definition of the term ‘gentrification’ in criminological research.  A term first introduced 
by sociologist Ruth Glass in the 1960s, gentrification takes its root from the English word 
‘gentry’ which generally refers to the landed aristocracy (wealthy residents whose wealth 
is derived from large landholdings) (Coss, 2003).  Initially, Glass used the term 
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gentrification to refer to a change she observed in London’s East End, where middle-class 
families began purchasing working-class housing and changing it into more “elegant, 
expensive residences.” (Glass, 1964: xviii).  This theme, the transformation of working-
class and abandoned housing into middle-class neighborhoods, has been a common 
feature of gentrification studies (Atkinson, 2000; Smith and Williams, 1986).  
Consequently, several examinations of the gentrification process have used indicators 
such as altered housing markets and demographic changes as key indicators that 
gentrification is taking place (Atkinson 2000, 2002; Pèrez, 2002; Schaffer and Smith, 
1986).  Others, however, focus on how gentrification impacts commerce in a community.  
Sometimes referred to as the “Starbucks effect,” the expectation is that businesses 
catering to a working-class residency will be replaced by higher-end shops and cafés 
(Papachristos et al., 2011). 
Therefore, there are two major areas that need to be addressed in this line of 
research.  The first area entails generating an operationalization of gentrification that can 
be replicated and used in future research.  As mentioned, at times this process is 
measured through commerce and business changes, and at other times it is measured by 
residential turnover and changes in housing markets.  While changing commerce poses 
intriguing questions for future research, the current study will examine gentrification as it 
pertains to population and demographic change.  This is consistent with Glass’s original 
conceptualization, and allows the current study to build upon several prior studies that 
have examined gentrification in this manner.  Prior research has generally studied 
gentrification’s impact on crime by measuring structural and demographic indicators and 
then measuring crime, but this leaves important questions unanswered about the causal 
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mechanisms at work.  Therefore, the second area which needs to be addressed is a 
consideration of how it is that this phenomenon causes crime changes, and importantly, 
whether or not crime should also be considered as an independent variable, itself 
influencing gentrification in the process.  
Neighborhood Characteristics as Static 
 Interest in neighborhood characteristics and their relationship to crime has been a 
part of criminology since the work of 19
th
 century moral statisticians such as Guerry 
(1833) and Quetelet (1831).  These moral statisticians demonstrated that characteristics 
such as poverty, population mobility, and population heterogeneity were linked to a 
variety of social problems and shown to vary systematically with crime in shaded 
chloropleth maps.  By identifying such regularities in crime and other social problems, 
scholars like Querry and Quetelet implied that environmental influences are critical in the 
explanation of social problems, thus paving the way for the sociological study of crime in 
the 20
th
 century (Bierne, 1987). 
In the early 20
th
 century, sociologists such as Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) 
examined characteristics of Chicago neighborhoods and commented that the breakdown 
of immigrant peasant communities was leading to a variety of social problems.  
Thrasher’s (1927) examination of gangs in Chicago was the first to use the term social 
disorganization to describe the inability of neighborhoods to realize common values or 
solve problems collectively.  From there, scholars at the University of Chicago began 
working within a social disorganization framework; building off the human ecological 
models of urban development (Park, 1936; Park and Burgess, 1925; Zorbaugh, 1929), 
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they described neighborhoods in a state of disruption that had little cohesion and could 
not organize to solve their problems.  This framework was based upon the idea that cities 
are only spatially pathological; there are some sections that seem to have stable high 
levels of crime regardless of who lives there.  Because of this, researchers looked at 
delinquency within neighborhoods and attributed it to larger neighborhood-level control 
factors. 
 Much of the early work in social disorganization emphasized the stability of 
certain neighborhood qualities that kept them in a state of disarray.  Economic problems, 
population mobility, and population heterogeneity were the primary conditions that 
research described as problematic (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Thrasher, 1927).  However, 
critics of this framework have pointed out that these conditions within neighborhoods 
may not have the stability they once did in the early 20
th
 century (Bursik, 1988).  Even 
modern-era research in neighborhood-level control generally begins with structural-level 
characteristics considered to be fairly constant over time (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; 
Lowenkamp et al., 2003; Sampson, 1988; Sampson and Groves, 1989).  In doing this, the 
discipline has made enormous strides in unpacking the different dimensions of 
neighborhood control, and demonstrating the power of neighborhood context.  However, 
what has been missing is a consideration of what happens to these neighborhood-level 
influences once the structural characteristics within the neighborhood significantly 
change.  Gentrification often causes just such a significant change, and while 
neighborhood-level control theories provide a framework for examining this 
phenomenon, it has yet to be empirically examined in this way.  In the current project, 
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one goal will be to approach the study of gentrification and crime from the perspective of 
neighborhood-level social control. 
Reliance on Official Data 
 The research that has examined gentrification and crime has necessarily employed 
data taken from the decennial U.S. Census to examine long-term changes in the 
demographic profiles of urban areas.  This is not surprising, as the Census offers a 
consistent, long-term collection of data relevant to a discussion about gentrification.  
Studies examining a connection between gentrification and crime have used Census data 
for individual cities (Covington and Taylor, 1989; Kreager, Lyons, and Hays, 2011; 
O’Sullivan, 2005; Taylor and Covington, 1988) and for research examining multiple 
urban areas over time (McDonald, 1986).  Additionally, studies examining gentrification 
and crime have employed similar data to that collected in the Census in European cities 
such as London (Atkinson, 2000, 2002, 2004; Hamnett, 2003) and Bilbao (Vicario and 
Monje, 2003).   
 Only recently, however, have researchers begun to integrate alternative data into 
the study of gentrification and crime.  This is a critical step in understanding what 
connections may exist between these processes.  For example, in their examination of 
gentrification and crime in Chicago, Papachristos et al. (2011) combine Census data with 
information on the number of coffee shops in a neighborhood.   
 The current study utilizes Census data, but combines it with other data sources.  
By utilizing data obtained from the Chicago Transit Authority and the Project on Human 
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) the current project incorporates city 
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data and information gathered from the residents themselves.  In this way, this research 
hopes to not only examine the objective changes but also the subjective experience of 
residents in these areas.  
Dearth of Criminological Theory in Gentrification Research 
 Finally, a limitation of prior research on the connection between gentrification 
and crime is the lack of a theoretical framework within which this interaction may be 
examined.  This absence of a theoretical footing has resulted in several studies identifying 
patterns between gentrification and crime, but few scholars examining the causal 
mechanisms at work.  In short, prior research has provided important clues as to how 
gentrification and crime may vary, but few have established a clear explanation as to why 
this is the case.  The is understandable, however, when it is considered that only a few 
recent studies on gentrification and crime have been conducted and published within 
criminology and criminal justice-related journals (for example, Papachristos et al., 2011).   
The current project proposes that the study of gentrification and crime fits well 
within the group threat and neighborhood-level social control framework.
1
  The role of 
social networks, social capital, and collective efficacy in a neighborhood experiencing 
gentrification all have the potential to interact with this process and alter its effect on 
crime.  After all, when a neighborhood experiences gentrification, it does not just happen 
around its residents, it also happens to them.  Neighborhood-level control mechanisms 
                                                          
1
 I choose to refer to this body of research as ‘neighborhood-level control theories’ rather than the 
traditional term ‘social disorganization’ for a few reasons.  It is a broader term encompassing more of the 
modern era of research in this area, and it reflects how this theoretical perspective has evolved over time 
since the pioneering work of Shaw and McKay (1942).  It also shares foundational properties with social 
control theories at the individual-level (e.g. Hirschi’s (1969) theory of social bonds), so referring to these 
theoretical areas with similar terms makes sense from an organizational perspective. 
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may help explain why gentrification is associated with changes in crime, and also why 
different neighborhoods may respond to the gentrification process in different ways.  The 
role of group threat has also proven to play a powerful role in shaping people’s 
perceptions, stereotypes, and behavior.  It may be that in some gentrifying neighborhoods 
these changes are not well-received; therefore mounting tension and dissatisfaction with 
the gentrification process may have real and harmful consequences.  These 
criminological theories offer a theoretical framework within which the relationship 
between gentrification and crime may be explored in the current study and in future 
research.  This dissertation, therefore, represents an initial step in exploring gentrification 
and crime within the contexts of neighborhood-level social control and group threat. 
Current Research Agenda 
In a recent Crime and Justice article, David Kirk and John Laub (2010) discussed 
the small but growing research agenda to understand gentrification’s role in crime within 
communities.  They discussed several puzzles still left unanswered by research through 
the early 21
st
 century.  First, they highlighted the fact that while several studies have 
attempted to draw inferences about a causal relationship between gentrifying 
neighborhoods and changing crime rates, there have only been suggestions of potential 
mechanisms at work and little effort to actually measure and identify these factors (Kirk 
and Laub, 2010).  A few studies have discussed social control mechanisms that may be at 
work in destabilizing neighborhoods undergoing gentrification, but these are inferences 
that have yet to be empirically evaluated (Covington and Taylor, 1989; Van Wilsem et 
al., 2006).  Second, they note the dearth of empirical research on displacement, a key 
element to the definition of gentrification.  Few scholars have attempted to examine the 
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impact of displacement of crime due to gentrification, although a few informative case 
studies suggest that this may occur (Curtis, 1998; 2003).  Finally, in their discussion of 
future research directions, Kirk and Laub (2010: 487) suggest that causal mechanisms 
and the “velocity of change” are critical unanswered questions in the neighborhood 
change and gentrification literature.  Correlations between neighborhood-level indicators 
of gentrification and crime have long been observed, but we still have little understanding 
as to how these relationships come about.  In empirical studies of gentrification a key 
element seems to be the speed at which changes occur (Covington and Taylor, 1989; 
Schuerman and Kobrin, 1986), but attempts to measure the pace of changes has not been 
attempted. 
The aim of the current research project is to address some of these puzzles.  As it 
stands today, researchers have only begun to understand the complex ways in which 
gentrification can cause changes in crime at the neighborhood level.  A primary goal of 
the current project is to contribute to the growing body of research on gentrification and 
crime and to do so in a way that sheds light on the social control and perceived 
neighborhood change mechanisms that may be at work.  A key component of this project 
will be a review of the operationalization of the process of gentrification.  While no 
measure will ever be perfect, it is my hope that this dissertation will provide a working 
measurement tool to examine the gentrification process which can be replicated and used 
in future research.  I begin this research study without making any immediate assumption 
as to the direction of the effect between gentrification and crime, but instead hope to offer 
a clear operationalization of the term so that an association can be identified.    Therefore, 
the first question which shall be explored in this dissertation is: 
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RQ1:  What is gentrification’s impact on crime?   
 
Given the conflicting results from the small number of early studies on 
gentrification and crime, it is important to first examine how crime patterns look in 
neighborhoods experiencing this form of neighborhood change.  It is also the intention of 
this research to examine the potential for crime displacement; as Kirk and Laub (2010) 
indicate, this is an area missing from prior research on gentrification and crime and one 
which has both theoretical and practical policy implications.  This introduces the second 
research question in this dissertation: 
RQ2:   Is there evidence for crime displacement from gentrifying neighborhoods 
to nearby areas? 
 
This research questions addresses a concern that some have discussed as a 
potential consequence of gentrification.  While several scholars have offered analyses of 
residential displacement as a result of gentrification, to date an empirical assessment of 
whether or not there is a spatial displacement of crime has not been conducted.  The 
current research will attempt to fill this hole in the gentrification and crime literature. 
To address the possibility that the effect of gentrification on crime may vary by 
neighborhood context, the following questions will be explored: 
RQ 3:  How do informal social control and perceived neighborhood change 
mechanisms interact with the process of gentrification? 
3a:  Is the relationship between gentrification and crime moderated by 
social control mechanisms such as collective efficacy? 
3b:  Does the relationship between gentrification and crime vary by the 




 The link between the control perspective and gentrification has been discussed, 
but never empirically examined.  In general, most empirical research on gentrification 
and crime has come from outside the discipline of criminology.  Understandably, this has 
meant an absence of criminological theory in gentrification and crime research to date.  
By placing this research within the context of collective efficacy and group threat, I hope 
to shed light onto the underlying mechanisms which may moderate the relationship 
between gentrification and crime. 
 I believe that thinking of collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood change 
mechanisms as potential moderators is appropriate for a few reasons.  In general, 
moderator variables have the potential to impact both the strength and the direction of 
relationships between predictor and dependent variables (Baron and Kenny, 1986).  In the 
current study, I suggest that the relationship between gentrification and crime is highly 
dependent upon the contextual factors of collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood 
change.  Specific hypotheses will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this project, but in a 
similar manner to prior research which has demonstrated the benefits of collective 
efficacy in neighborhoods (Sampson et al., 1997), I hypothesize that collective efficacy 
will be a significant benefit in neighborhoods experiencing gentrification. 
 Drawing from research on group and minority threat, this research also 
investigates whether the perception of the changes caused by gentrification matters.  
Most prior research examines all gentrifying neighborhoods together, assuming a fairly 
similar reception and experience in each.  However, group threat literature has shown that 
changes to the population of an area are sometimes accompanied by perceptions of threat, 
anger, and resentment which ultimately cause disruption and crime (Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 
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1988).  Through this research, I will examine whether or not perceived neighborhood 
change processes play a role in moderating the relationship between gentrification and 
crime.  In this way, it will be possible to examine whether perceived neighborhood 
change makes problems such as crime worse in a gentrifying neighborhood. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
Discussion of gentrification and crime necessarily must include a thorough review 
of the emergence of gentrification as a phenomenon and research topic.  In Chapter 2, I 
summarize the body of knowledge about gentrification over the past several decades, 
beginning with its introduction in social science in the 1960s and including the body of 
research that has examined the link between gentrification and crime.  In Chapter 3, I 
summarize the research involved in the conceptualization and measurement of 
neighborhoods and neighborhood-level effects.  Chapter 4 reviews the research on 
neighborhood-level social control and the research on group and minority threat 
dynamics.  Chapter 5 presents a theoretical framework which combines these areas into 
one cohesive interpretation of how these processes come together and interact. 
Chapter 6 will introduce details pertaining to the current study’s hypotheses, data, 
measures, and analytic strategies.  Chapter 7 will present the results of the analyses 
examining both the effect of the contextual factors and the results of the displacement 
analyses.  The dissertation will conclude with Chapter 8, which will be a summary of the 
research findings, including a discussion of the policy implications, the limitations, and 




CHAPTER 2   GENTRIFICATION – HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, 
MEASUREMENT, AND ITS IMPACT ON CRIME 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the interaction of gentrification, 
social control, and perceived neighborhood change forces on crime over time.  In this 
chapter, I begin by summarizing the extant literature on gentrification, beginning with a 
discussion of the concept itself and how it has been understood, operationally defined, 
and discussed in previous research.  I will then review the literature to date on 
gentrification’s impact on crime, and discuss the issue of crime displacement.  In the next 
chapter, I review the findings from contemporary research on neighborhood change and 
crime.  Finally, as I suspect that the impact of gentrification is not homogenous but is 
affected by both social control and group threat dynamics, I move in the following 
chapter to a review of modern research on neighborhood-level social control, with 
particular attention paid to collective efficacy, and on the relevant research in racial and 
ethnic threat. 
Defining Gentrification 
 The genesis of the term ‘gentrification’ is generally acknowledged to come from 
urban geographer Ruth Glass in her 1964 book London: Aspects of Change.  Glass used 
the term gentrification to refer to young, mostly single middle- and upper-class residents 
purchasing property in the historically impoverished area of London’s East End (Glass, 
1964). 
One by one, many of the working-class quarters of London have been 
invaded by the middle classes – upper and lower.  Shabby, modest mews 
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and cottages… have been taken over when their leases expired and have 
become elegant expensive residences.  Larger Victorian houses, 
downgraded in an earlier or recent period – which were used as lodging 
houses or were otherwise multiple occupation – have been upgraded 
again.  Once this process of ‘gentrification’ starts in a district it goes on 
rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are 
displaced and the whole social character of the districts is changed.” 
(Glass, 1963: xviii). 
Interestingly, from its beginning the term had both socially and politically charged 
connotations; Glass described gentrification as a dangerous process because it was 
eliminating housing and driving poor residents out of their neighborhoods.  By the 1970s, 
Glass’s tone describing the phenomenon grew more somber, describing the changes in 
London neighborhoods such as Hampstead and Chelsea as tragedies.  While many 
scholars had taken to interpreting the phenomenon as a benign, even positive process of 
neighborhood revitalization, Glass described the process as more of an upper-middle-
class invasion and succession (Glass, 1973).  It is important to be aware of the charged 
nature in which this phenomenon entered into academic discussion; from its beginning, 
gentrification has been a process which many write about with a very specific ideological 
or political bias. 
While Glass was the first author to use the phrase gentrification, this particular 
phenomenon of neighborhood change has been discussed elsewhere in urban 
development.  Hoover and Vernon’s (1959) examination of the New York City 
metropolitan area revealed that cities have a ‘life cycle’ which can be broken into five 
stages:  development, transition, downgrading, thinning out, and renewal.  In their model, 
gentrification can be placed in the renewal stage because middle- and upper-class 
residents will jump on the opportunity to purchase and renovate large dwellings for a 
relatively inexpensive cost (Hoover and Vernon, 1959; Kirk and Laub, 2010).  Smith and 
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LeFaivre (1984: 44) emphasize that gentrification should not just be described as a 
physical process, but a social one as well, and stress that the changes a community 
experiences as a result of gentrification often involve clashes as a result of 
“fundamentally opposed class interests.” 
 Modern interpretations of the term focus on the changes in social demographics 
and social class experienced in a gentrifying neighborhood.  For example, Smith and 
Williams (1986:1) describe gentrification as the “rehabilitation of working-class and 
derelict housing and the consequent transformation of an area into a middle-class 
neighborhood.” Most interpret the process as one involving young singles or young 
couples, and importantly, as one involving the migration of people within the city, and 
not moving into the city from suburban or rural areas (Butler, 1997; Hamnett, 1984; 
Smith and Williams, 1986).  Kennedy and Leonard (2001: 1) define gentrification as “the 
process of neighborhood change that results in the replacement of lower income residents 
with higher income ones.” However, there is no consensus as to precisely how 
transferable the concept of gentrification is over time and across social contexts (Smith, 
1996).  For example, the emphasis in most definitions is on a change in the social class of 
neighborhoods experiencing gentrification.  We know that in many cases this also means 
changes in the racial composition of the neighborhood (e.g. Smith, 1996) but this is not 
always the case; research has also examined gentrification in places such as Harlem in 
New York and Bronzeville in Chicago where gentrification occurred in historically black 
neighborhoods and the population moving in was predominantly black middle-class 
residents (Freeman, 2005; Hyra, 2008).  The majority of examinations of gentrification 
can be found in the urban planning literature, and within this research scholars have 
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argued that gentrification is often a hectic, scattered process which is better understood as 
many different processes interacting over time within neighborhoods (Beauregard, 1986).  
In addition, urban planning research suggests that gentrification may take many shapes, 
and depending on local context we should expect to see many types of gentrification 
(Lees, 2000).   
 In other treatments, gentrification has been defined as a “churning” process which 
results in changes not only to residents but to commercial establishments around them.  
Papachristos and colleagues (2011) recently measured gentrification to include changes 
to businesses and amenities within neighborhoods as signs of gentrification (Papachristos 
et al., 2011).  
 In summary, gentrification as a phenomenon can take many forms, but class 
invasion and population succession characterize almost all prior treatments of the 
concept.  It rarely happens uniformly across a neighborhood, and the literature still 
cannot agree as to what elements must be in place to define a neighborhood as 
‘gentrifying.’  The process has historically been examined looking only at changes to the 
population, but modern research includes elements of revitalization to commercial 
properties as well.  An important step to take in our understanding of this process must be 
to determine a way to operationalize gentrification so that it will be replicated and tested 
across multiple social contexts.  While it would be impossible for any one study to 
produce the perfect operationalization of such a nuanced term, the current study aims to 




Gentrification: A Loaded Term 
 It is important to note that many scholars who have written about the process 
approach the phenomenon of gentrification by highlighting either its benefits or its 
harms.  Housing policy research often contends that gentrification is a dangerous process 
because of its uneven application within neighborhoods; this can at times result in small 
pockets of a neighborhood getting refurbished, amidst others that are boarded up and 
abandoned.  Depictions in recent work describe it as a process that leaves “islands of 
decay in seas of renewal.” (Wyley and Hammel, 1999: 711).  Some take issue with the 
concept itself, arguing that the word gentrification is a glossy, euphemistic phrase 
masking the actual process, deconcentrating poverty to make way for capital investment 
(Crump, 2002; Smith, 2002).  Along this line, critics often highlight the racial tensions 
built into gentrification, where the “white middle- and upper-classes retake control of the 
political and cultural economics as well as the geography of the largest cities.” (Smith, 
2002).    
Gentrification and Population Relocation – Early Research 
Interest in gentrification sparked researchers in the 1970s to examine its impact in 
European and American cities.  Most of this initial research examined the extent to which 
gentrification resulted in rises in the cost of living which forced long-time residents to 
relocate.  The image in this research is of long-time residents who are either unhappy 
with the ways in which their neighborhood has changed, or unable to afford the changes 
to basic costs of living.  From property taxes, to the costs of basic amenities such as 
groceries, the suggestion is that longtime residents get ‘priced out.’  Research has pointed 
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to several ways for population relocation to occur; the most commonly noted are 
population losses and changes in demographic indicators of social class.  In many areas 
undergoing gentrification, a population loss has been observed due to more affluent 
families purchasing multi-unit homes and converting them back into large, single-family 
dwellings (Atkinson, 2000; Wagner, 1995).  In this way, gentrification is thought to lead 
to gentrifiers under-occupying their neighborhood, because one family lives in a home 
that several families used to share (Bailey and Robertson, 1997).  A large study of New 
York City neighborhoods in the 1980s concluded that anywhere from 10,000 – 40,000 
households were displaced in a given year (Marcuse, 1986).  In a study examining 
London neighborhoods undergoing gentrification from 1981 – 1991, results showed that 
the declines in the population were specifically due to inactive residents, elderly, and 
working class residents moving away (Atkinson, 2000). 
Unfortunately, a review of the early research on gentrification leaves no definitive 
answer as to the extent and nature of gentrification and population relocation; early 
efforts often came to contradictory conclusions, some suggesting that a high degree of 
population relocation occurs and others suggesting that it is negligible (Auger, 1979; 
Freeman, 2005; Hoover and Vernon, 1959; Sumka 1979).  In an early examination of 
gentrification and population relocation in five U.S. cities, Schill and Nathan (1983) 
conducted a survey asking renters why they were choosing to leave a neighborhood.  
Although there was wide variation across the cities as to the amount of population 
relocation, their results showed that on average about 23 percent of those moving out of 
an area were forced to relocate; they cited rising costs of living and indicated that they 
had to move though they did not want to.    
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A common methodology utilized in population relocation research is post-move 
surveys.  Such research has been conducted in London (Atkinson, 2000) and New York 
City (Newman and Wyly, 2006), asking survey respondents who are new to an area to 
give reasons for their recent move.  In several of these initial attempts to assess 
population relocation, research hinted that population relocation due to gentrification may 
be negligible (Grier and Grier, 1978; Lee and Hodge, 1984; Newman and Owen, 1982).  
However, in many of these early surveys the former residence of the respondents were 
unable to be identified; therefore, it is impossible to determine how much population 
relocation is actually due to gentrification and how much is due to more natural 
succession patterns (Freeman and Braconi, 2004).  For example, it could be that the 
survey respondents made a lateral move – their new neighborhood looks very much like 
their old one.  High turnover from a neighborhood might also happen due to factors other 
than gentrification, such as a sudden rise in unemployment.  By measuring people in their 
new neighborhood, this research was unable to provide a detailed examination of the 
community from which they were displaced. 
Succession methodology has also been utilized to assess population relocation due 
to gentrification.  In this research, the characteristics of residents who are new to an area 
are compared to the characteristics of those who have moved out.  Again, early studies 
using this technique concluded that population relocation due to gentrification was 
minimal (Henig 1980; Spain, Reid and Long, 1980).  This technique, however, has its 
own measurement problems.  While it is possible to conclude that population changes 
have taken place, succession methodology makes it impossible to determine the reasons 
for this change.  The assumption made in this early research using succession 
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methodology was that gentrification explains the turnover.  However, it is impossible to 
tell what reasons former residents had for moving out; it could have been due to 
gentrification, but there are also many unobserved explanations which could play a role 
in residential turnover (Freeman and Braconi, 2004). 
This preliminary research examining gentrification and population relocation 
leaves many questions unanswered.  Most important to the current study, however, is the 
still unanswered question as to whether or not crime appears to be displaced when a 
neighborhood experiences gentrification.  This will be a central focus of the current 
research. 
Gentrification in Harlem 
 Several neighborhoods in New York City experienced gentrification during the 
1990s, and an area that has garnered the most media attention and subsequent research is 
Harlem.  Located at the top of Manhattan Island, Harlem’s boundaries stretch across the 
top of the island, with the East River and Hudson River along its sides, 155
th
 street to the 
north, and Central Park and 96
th
 street to the south.
2
  In 1986, Schafer and Smith wrote an 
article called, “The Gentrification of Harlem?” the title itself suggesting that the 
researchers were questioning whether or not this traditionally lower- and working-class 
African American area of the city was susceptible to gentrification in the future.
3
  Several 
factors hinted that this may be the case.  Harlem had been experiencing a decline in 
population during the 1970s (Stegman, 1982), its location just north of Central Park 
offered promise for developers, and although there were many vacancies, its residential 
                                                          
2
 Retrieved from http://www.NYC.gov on May 15, 2013. 
3
 U.S. Census Bureau data show that in 1980, Central Harlem was 96.1% black, had 65.5% of households 
in the low-income bracket, and 5.2% of adults were college graduates (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1983). 
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areas were filled with late 19
th
 century brownstones which were being used as multi-unit 
dwellings and could be renovated and converted into single-family homes (Shafer and 
Smith, 1986).  The article concludes by suggesting that although gentrification has not 
happened yet, Harlem could be ripe for the process in the near future. 
 In subsequent years, researchers and media reports demonstrated that Harlem did 
indeed experience gentrification.  Housing prices surged, private developers came in and 
planned luxury condominiums and retail spaces, and a new wave of middle-class African 
American residents came from other areas of the city (Wyly and Hammel, 1999).  An 
article in The New York Times discussed the strong pull of Harlem for affluent blacks: 
Black professionals are snatching up 5,000-square-foot 
brownstones off avenues named for black leaders… they 
are also looking to bring the amenities they had found in 
SoHo and the Upper West Side to neighborhoods that, 
while on the upswing, are still marked by abandonment and 
a dearth of shops and restaurants. (Foderaro, 1998: B5) 
 In 2006, Dr. Lance Freeman published There Goes the ‘Hood, a book describing 
the gentrification process experienced by several New York City neighborhoods in the 
1990s, and offered a detailed explanation for why this area seems to have experienced 
such dramatic improvements in both crime and citizen satisfaction.  According to his 
research, a high amount of displacement had not taken place.  Challenging the notion that 
there is always a high amount of displacement in gentrifying neighborhoods, Freeman 
found that poor families living in gentrifying neighborhoods in Harlem were actually 
24% less likely to relocate than families in non-gentrifying areas (Freeman, 2006).   
 What Freeman (2006) and several other commentators also observed in Harlem, is 
that the in-movers were often African American, much like the long-time residents who 
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remained.  They tended to be younger, working professionals, but their entrance into the 
neighborhoods did not significantly alter the racial profile of the area.  In several news 
reports, it was described as the ‘New Harlem Renaissance’ because those moving in 
embraced the long-standing culture and mystique of this area (Williams, 2008).  One 
such article quotes an interview with an African American man who had recently moved 
into the area: 
 I have always had a fascination with the Harlem of legend 
and folklore… Reading the writers of the Harlem 
Renaissance created a lot of mythologies in our heads.  I 
just felt this visceral kind of connection that I don’t know 
how to describe. (Foderaro, 1998: B5). 
 What lessons can we take from the gentrification of Harlem that can be applied to 
the current research project?  It appears that gentrification as a process cannot be assumed 
to have a uniform effect (either negative or positive) on the various neighborhoods 
experiencing it.  When the gentrification process threatens and disrupts the long-standing 
group dynamics and racial profile of a neighborhood, and when a neighborhood does not 
have the cohesion and efficacy to act in response to problems, crime may increase during 
these rapid periods of change and renewal.  However, as is the case in 1990s Harlem, 
when gentrification happens but the longstanding group dynamics are not threatened, and 
when the neighborhood has a high level of cohesion and efficacy, crime may decrease as 
a result.  A close examination of this process has not been attempted in Harlem, because 
the only data taken during that era were data charting the demographic changes.  
However, the data gathered at the community level in Chicago in the 1990s may shed 




 In this disruption of group dynamics, it is suggested that gentrification may work 
to threaten the prevailing neighborhood culture of an area.  The presence of neighborhood 
culture was introduced in the early work on social disorganization in criminological 
theory.  Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) described the loss of cultural identity in the 
younger generations of Polish immigrants in early 20
th
 century Chicago, and Shaw and 
McKay (1942) suggest that neighborhood culture may work to transmit attitudes 
favorable to deviance amongst youth gangs.  In his ethnographic work in Philadelphia, 
Eli Anderson (1999) also demonstrated that in many disadvantaged areas there is a 
prevailing ‘code of the street’ which residents either embrace or learn how to maneuver.  
The idea that the weakening of neighborhood culture may be associated with various 
forms of crime has also been examined; Barbara Warner (2003), for example, refers to 
this weakening as ‘cultural attenuation.  In neighborhoods experiencing gentrification, 
one potential problem with this process could be the loss of a neighborhood’s cultural 
identity.  Conversely, gentrification efforts that attempt to preserve an area’s cultural 
identity may experience better outcomes than those whose long-time residents feel as if 
their neighborhood’s character and identity has been sanitized and taken away. 
 
Gentrification’s Impact on Crime 
 Interest in gentrification’s specific impact on crime can be traced to the 1980s 
when Scott McDonald (1986) wrote one of the first papers addressing the relationship 
between gentrification and crime rates.  His paper examined fourteen neighborhoods 
from five major U.S. cities (Boston, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington 
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DC) and examined tabular crime data from 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1984.  McDonald 
examined changes over this time span and determined that a negative association existed 
between gentrification and violent crime.  While he did not find that property crime is 
reduced in gentrifying areas, he did suggest that it may be difficult for neighborhoods 
undergoing gentrification to improve because crime may act as a “feedback loop” and 
prevent them from becoming more stable (McDonald, 1986).  This initial examination of 
gentrification and crime was not without its limitations, most notably the method used to 
determine which neighborhoods were gentrifying.  Neighborhoods were considered to be 
gentrifying based on the author’s familiarity with the areas, and while some 
neighborhoods were included due to changes in the residential population, others were 
included for undergoing commercial changes (McDonald, 1986).  Aside from this initial 
study, there have only been a few attempts to examine gentrification’s impact on crime 
with their results yielding contradictory and often complex relationships.   
Taylor and Covington (1988) examined crime in improving Baltimore 
neighborhoods during the 1970s.  By examining census data in 1970 and 1980, and UCR 
Part I crime data for each year, they determined that gentrification’s impact varies by 
crime type.  In gentrifying areas, for example, violent crimes (murder and assault) rose, 
but property crimes declined.  The authors compared two processes, social 
disorganization and relative deprivation.  Relative deprivation refers to one’s perceived 
sense of being worse-off than others.  While objective qualities of poverty have long been 
used to explain crime, the authors suggest that the effects of relative deprivation may 
increase violence due to an increasing sense of injustice (Taylor and Covington, 1988).  
The authors determined that in gentrifying neighborhoods social disorganization explains 
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more of the variation in violence.  They assert that being in a state of change can be 
detrimental to the neighborhood’s standards and norms (Taylor and Covington, 1988).  
These authors followed up this study with another examination of gentrification in 
Baltimore during the 1970s, this time examining robbery and larceny (Covington and 
Taylor, 1989).  In this study, they again found that gentrifying areas experienced rises in 
crime, but only in robbery; larceny rates did not change in areas undergoing 
gentrification.  They suggest that neighborhood change that occurs rapidly may act to 
destabilize neighborhoods, and weaken informal social control.   
A positive relationship has also been observed utilizing victimization data.  In a 
recent study in the Netherlands, similar results were found looking at residents’ risk of 
victimization for theft, violence, and vandalism.  Utilizing survey data from all 25 Dutch 
police regions in 1999, the authors constructed a socioeconomic disadvantage index, and 
observed a positive relationship between rapid positive change in this index and crime 
victimization (Van Wilsem et al., 2006).  Presenting the phenomenon from a rational 
choice and opportunity perspective, Lee (2010) used data from Los Angeles in the early 
1990s and observed a positive relationship between gentrification and property crime, 
which he attributed to the fact that incoming more affluent residents provide “greater 
payoffs and new opportunities for criminal behavior” (Lee, 2010: 572).   
 Not all studies have suggested that gentrification leads to an increase in crime, in 
fact some researchers have instead suggested that it is declining crime rates which spark 
gentrification.  A recent study in Portland, Oregon during the 1990s suggests that drops in 
crime led to neighborhoods being revitalized, and the displacement of lower income 
residents further lowers the crime rate (O’Sullivan, 2005).  Papachristos and colleagues 
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(2011) recently conducted a study in Chicago examining gentrification in primarily 
White, Black, and Latino neighborhoods and concluded that the process is experienced 
differently across social contexts.  While homicide rates declined in all three types of 
gentrifying neighborhoods, there was an increase in street robberies in the predominantly 
Black areas (Papachristos et al., 2011).
4
 
 Thus far, the research discussed has suggested either a positive or a negative 
relationship between gentrification and crime in a neighborhood.  The research 
suggesting a positive relationship (Covington and Taylor, 1989; Lee, 2010; Taylor and 
Covington, 1988; Van Wilsem et al., 2006) tends to suggest that gentrification is a 
destabilizing influence. 
Variables related to social disorganization are discussed as possibly being able to 
explain the relationship, although these are rarely tested directly (McDonald, 1986).    
The research suggesting that a negative relationship exists between gentrification and 
crime vary in both their definition of gentrification, and in the extent to which crime 
declines as a result of it (O’Sullivan, 2005; Papachristos et al., 2011).  They also disagree 
on the causal agent – some argue that dropping crime causes gentrification, while others 
suggest that it is this reinvestment that sparks the changes in crime.   
Another possible relationship that has been explored is that the relationship 
between gentrification and crime is nonlinear.  It may be the case that gentrification 
results in rises in crime initially, but this effect becomes less significant as time passes.  A 
recent study in Seattle used tract-level census data from the 1990s and their results 
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 Papachristos et al. (2011) provide a possible explanation as to why there were racial differences in the 
impact of gentrification. 
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support a ‘curvilinear’ relationship; areas that saw renewal and revitalization efforts 
experienced small increases in crime initially, but over the entire decade these tracts saw 
reductions in crime (Kreager et al., 2011).   
Others have suggested a nonlinear relationship, where gentrification results in an 
increase in crime initially but after a certain point its effect weakens.  In other words, a 
relationship that has been suggested but never empirically proven is that gentrification’s 
impact on crime may be strong initially but once crime increases to a certain point a 
variety of outside factors may cause it to continue at its heightened level (Van Wilsem et 
al., 2006).   
New Contributions to Research on Gentrification and Crime 
 While prior research has laid the foundation upon which gentrification and crime 
can be examined, the current study hopes to build off this prior research and extend it by 
addressing some problems and unexamined areas.  First, there is a lack of agreement in 
the field as to how gentrification should be measured.  One challenge in this field has 
been the ability to systematically identify areas that are in fact experiencing 
gentrification.  For example, in Covington and Taylor’s (1989) gentrification study in 
Baltimore, they used a single measure of gentrification, changes in house-value percentile 
scores as reported by owner-occupied housing in each Baltimore neighborhood.  By 
regressing percentile scores in 1980 on their 1970 scores, they were able to capture 
residuals which they surmised could be used as evidence of gentrification; large positive 
residuals indicating a large increase in the housing value over the decade (Covington and 
Taylor, 1989).  While housing value has long been noted as a valuable indicator of 
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neighborhood change (DeGiovanni and Paulson, 1984; Lee and Mergenhagen, 1984) 
Covington and Taylor’s (1989) measure of residual change does not account for the prior 
state of housing values in the neighborhood.  A neighborhood that had initially high 
housing values and experienced a large increase could be misinterpreted as a 
‘gentrifying’ neighborhood in this study, because degree of change was the only element 
examined.  A few early studies also focused primarily on changes in homeownership, 
when gentrification may also occur by middle- and upper-class renters moving into an 
area (Lee, 2010).  This is problematic because homeownership rates may remain stable, 
but the social class and demographic profile of the residents may in fact change.  While 
the measure of gentrification used in the current study will have its own limitations, 
multiple items will be examined to determine the extent of gentrification, combining data 
from both the Census and the Chicago Transit Authority.  One goal of such a method of 
operationalization is that this measurement of gentrification can be used in future 
research to examine gentrification in other urban areas. 
 Second, in a few of the initial studies the neighborhoods were identified mainly 
based on the authors’ personal knowledge, and no criteria were given justifying their 
selection as neighborhoods undergoing gentrification.  For example, in McDonald’s 
(1986) study, he selected fourteen neighborhoods from five U.S. cities, and demonstrated 
through various characteristics that gentrification had occurred.  However, he did not 
justify what made these neighborhoods distinct from others in their respective cities, 
leaving the reader to assume that these were the only neighborhoods that experienced 
gentrification during the time period.  It may in fact be the case that these were the only 
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neighborhoods that experienced gentrification, but without clear selection criterion it 
leaves the question open for debate. 
 There will be limitations to any measurement tool attempting to capture 
gentrification, including the one used in this dissertation.  In the current research, the 
measure of gentrification will attempt to be more inclusive, factoring multiple 
characteristics into the operationalization of the process.  It is my hope that this method 
of measuring gentrification will complement prior work and serve as a useful 
measurement for future research. 
Gentrification and Displacement 
 Since the concept was introduced by Glass in the 1960s, a common concern with 
gentrification is the issue of displacement.  There are two contexts within which the issue 
of displacement may be relevant – the displacement of individuals and the displacement 
of crime.  Several studies have examined the potential for gentrification-induced 
displacement of individuals.  This can occur when appreciation in the housing market 
causes sharp rises in rents, forcing lower-income residents in a neighborhood to move 
elsewhere for a lower cost of living (Atkinson, 2000).  It can also occur when in-movers 
to an area disrupt the social networks and characteristics of a neighborhood, prompting 
long-time residents to relocate out of dissatisfaction with the community.  Freeman and 
Braconi (2004) distinguish between direct and secondary displacement, the former being 
the succession of one demographic or ethnic group by another due to a specific program, 
the latter referring to low-income residents moving due to appreciation of rent and taxes, 
neighborhood harassment, or removal of services.  Secondary displacement (also referred 
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to as ‘involuntary displacement’) is the version which has generated the most concern 
and research (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001; Levy, Comey, and Padilla, 2006; Marcuse, 
1986).  
 As a process, measuring the displacement of residents due to gentrification poses 
many methodological challenges, which may explain why research examining this issue 
is rarely done.  First, a study must track residents who relocate during a period of 
gentrification; their former and current addresses must be obtained.  The complexity and 
challenges with completing a study tracking such residents has been discussed frequently 
in the gentrification literature as a limiting factor in the progression of this research 
(Hamnett and Williams, 1980; LeGates and Hartman, 1986).  Second, researchers must 
ascertain the reasons for the move; the term ‘displacement’ implies that residents were 
coerced or forced to relocate.  Individuals and families may relocate during a period of 
gentrification for a variety of reasons; this makes it difficult to prove that it was 
gentrification itself that forced the relocation to take place (Badcock and Cloher, 1980). 
 In a recent attempt to measure residential displacement following gentrification in 
central London, Atkinson (2000) measured displacement in three neighborhoods from 
1981 - 1991.  He concluded that displacement tends to impact renters who are single, 
elderly, or low-income families who are offered incentives to relocate (78% of those who 
were displaced were in unskilled occupations).  The Urban Institute examined 
neighborhoods in six major urban areas in the United States
5
 and examined displacement 
by conducting telephone interviews with residents to record displacement-mitigation 
                                                          
5
 Cities examined:  Atlanta, GA; Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; Sacramento, CA; Seattle, WA; St. 
Petersburg, FL (Levy et al. 2006). 
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initiatives and their success.  They found that addressing the affordable housing needs of 
low-income residents through targeted programming makes retention possible, but 
turnover continues to rapidly take place (Levy et al., 2006).  In New York City, Newman 
and Wyly (2006) examined housing and vacancy survey data collected every three years 
from 1991 – 2002.  They determined that for those moving within the city, displacement 
fluctuated between 6.2 – 9.9%, and concluded that “the vast majority of these households 
were forced to move by cost considerations.” (Newman and Wyly, 2006: 29). 
 Not all research has demonstrated a displacement effect.  Several studies assert 
that prior research on displacement suffers from a failure to properly quantify the 
problems associated with gentrification, assuming and giving the impression that 
displacement is a significant issue without the evidence (Freeman and Braconi, 2004).  
Freeman (2005) examined residential mobility and displacement using data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a national study of urban households from 
1986 – 1996, and came to the conclusion that displacement-induced effects are modest; 
mobility was not found to be significantly greater in gentrifying areas than elsewhere.  In 
subsequent work, Freeman (2006) has postulated that long-time residents may enjoy the 
improvements made to public space and resources in the area, and fight to remain.  
Housing initiatives such as rent control and asset-building strategies may encourage this 
(Levy et al., 2006). 
 While the extent to which gentrification causes residential displacement has been 
examined repeatedly, less attention has been given to the extent to which crime may be 
displaced due to gentrification.  However, there are theoretical arguments for why the 
spatial displacement of crime due to gentrification may occur.  In her seminal text The 
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Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs (1961: 35) discusses the 
importance of there being “eyes upon the street” to ensure safety.  She states that a city 
street with public spaces, shops, and restaurants sprinkled throughout will encourage a 
sort of involuntary policing by residents who are occupying the area.  Therefore, it could 
be suggested that when gentrification happens, this results in more vigilance to a 
neighborhood, which may encourage offenders to pursue crimes where there are not quite 
so many watchful eyes.  In the words of Jacobs (1961:34), “a well-used city street is apt 
to be a safe street.”  Therefore, if spatial displacement were to occur as a result of 
gentrification, it is logical to hypothesize that crime would be displaced to a nearby area 
where these changes and developments have not yet taken place.  Jacobs is by no means 
an advocate for gentrification; in the first sentence of her book she states that the book is 
intended as an “attack on current city planning and rebuilding” (Jacobs, 1961: 3).  
However, her insights into the mechanisms by which city streets may enhance safety 
provide a theoretical rationale for why crime may be spatially displaced when 
gentrification causes more activity and use of neighborhood space. 
In his examination of gentrifying neighborhoods in Boston, New York, San 
Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, DC, McDonald (1986: 163) begins his paper with the 
hypothesis that the “displacement of low-income residents by newcomers should reduce 
crime.” Although his study demonstrates that crime is reduced in the primary areas, it 
does not address whether or not the crime has been displaced along with the former 
residents.  Such research provides the current study with the motivation to explore the 
possibility of the spatial displacement of crime due to gentrification.  To date no study 
has offered an empirical examination of this process.  This may not be surprising, 
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however, given the challenges in measuring such a phenomenon.  It is difficult to prove 
that an increase in the crime rate in one neighborhood is directly caused by a decline in 
offending in a neighboring area.  Theoretically, it has been suggested that the low-income 
residents who are forced to relocate include many of the persons who would have been 
contributing to the local crime rate (Baldwin and Bottoms, 1976; Covington and Taylor, 
1989) but empirically this is difficult to prove.  Parallels can be drawn to the problems 
with measurement of crime displacement as a result of a policing intervention at a 
criminal ‘hot spot.’  When an intervention program is successful at lowering crime in the 
target area, one long-standing concern in this body of research has been that crime will 
relocate.  Reppetto (1976: 167) was one of the first to discuss this potential problem: 
“…will not the foreclosure of one type of criminal opportunity shift the incidence of 
crime to different forms, times, and locales?” However, recent analysis suggests that the 
spatial displacement of crime due to a policing intervention may be minimal.  In a study 
utilizing data from Jersey City, Weisburd et al. (2006) found little evidence for crime 
displacement, and instead demonstrated that the nearby areas benefited from the 
intervention program even though it was implemented nearby and not in that location.  In 
this way, they argue that when an intervention is implemented, adjacent areas may enjoy 
a diffusion of crime-reduction benefits rather than a rise in the crime rate. 
 While this offers insights for research on crime displacement and gentrification, it 
may be the case (and is quite likely) that gentrification and policing interventions have 
very different implications for the spatial displacement of crime.  Therefore, it is 
important to make clear at the beginning that the current study does not assume that 
similar causal mechanisms will be at work here as they are in hot spots policing research.  
36 
 
This is a critical point for a few reasons.  First, when a policing intervention occurs it 
does not cause residents to relocate, whereas gentrification has the potential for this to 
occur.  Second, the policing interventions in prior research were implemented in 
extremely small areas, often a single block face or intersection.  Gentrification, in 
contrast, can affect much larger areas in a neighborhood, and does not have a uniform 
impact across the area.  Thus, while the current study intends to examine gentrification 
and crime displacement in Chicago using the methodology from policing studies as a 
guide, there is no obvious reason to assume that the displacement results will be similar. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, modern research on gentrification suggests that there may be a negative 
association between gentrification and crime, although historically studies have found 
evidence for competing relationships.  The use of several different definitions and 
operationalizations of the concept of gentrification make generalized conclusions 
difficult.  There is a small but growing level of attention to this phenomenon in 
criminology, and while important work has been done to suggest contextual factors 
which may be involved few have attempted to empirically examine such mechanisms.  
Evidence of displacement from gentrification is at times weak, but there are theoretically 
compelling reasons to continue to explore the possibility that gentrification causes a 
spatial displacement of crime.  This dissertation hopes to reconcile a few of these 
problems and explore some missing elements in prior research examining gentrification 




CHAPTER THREE MEASUREMENT OF NEIGHBORHOODS AND 
NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL EFFECTS 
 
 Research examining gentrification in neighborhoods must necessarily stop to 
consider the conceptualization and measurement of ‘neighborhoods’ and ‘neighborhood-
level effects’ before embarking on an empirical evaluation of such factors.  In this 
chapter, I will discuss the use and definition of neighborhood as a unit of analysis and 
examine the methodological and theoretical literature on neighborhood-level effects. 
What is a Neighborhood? 
 Although many studies claim to study effects at the neighborhood-level, the 
conceptualization of what a neighborhood is remains difficult to consistently define.  The 
understanding of ‘neighborhood’ is not unlike the conceptualization of pornography in 
our legal system:  It’s difficult to define, but “everyone knows it when they see it.” 
(Galster, 2001: 2111).  In their groundbreaking book, Neighborhoods and Crime, Bursik 
and Grasmick (1993: 6) state that a neighborhood is “a small physical area embedded 
within a larger area in which people inhabit dwellings.” In neighborhoods, residents share 
proximity and must share in the circumstances that come out of living in a physically 
close space.  Similar definitions focus on the ecological aspects of neighborhoods, 
although some in urban studies include social elements into the definition, stating that a 
neighborhood is “a limited territory within a larger urban area, where people inhabit 
dwellings and interact socially” (Hallman, 1984: 13).  Attempting to resolve problems 
with prior definitions, Galster (2001: 2112) created the following definition for 
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neighborhoods:  “Neighborhood is the bundle of spatially based attributes associated with 
clusters of residences, sometimes in conjunction with other land uses.” 
One problem with modern conceptualization of neighborhoods is a presumption 
that residents in the area are in agreement on the physical boundaries; a resident on the 
border of a neighborhood may feel more socially connected to another neighborhood 
(Galster, 2001).  However, several scholars point out that the concept of living in a 
neighborhood and living in a ‘community’ are not necessarily synonymous (Guest and 
Lee, 1984; Lee and Campbell, 1997).  Neighborhoods and their residents may share 
attitudes, relationships, and common sentiments, but this is not necessarily the case (Kirk 
and Laub, 2010).  In contrast, discussion of a community implies a group sharing such 
sentiments and solidarity.  A discussion of community factors should refer to intangible 
qualities amongst residents, whereas neighborhood factors are thought of as more 
objective; you can spatially plot the boundaries of a neighborhood, but for a community 
this is not the case (Kirk and Laub, 2010; Tilly, 1973). 
 Given the growing trend toward globalization, some have recently questioned 
whether or not neighborhoods or the study of community still matters.  In the current era 
of telecommuting, the Internet, and plane travel, some would argue that variation at the 
local level has lost its importance.  The current study contends that neighborhoods 
continue to have significance in the explanation of social processes within.  The changing 
nature of our routine activities and socialization patterns necessitates a modern approach 
to community- and neighborhood-level research, but the answer is not to abandon the 
study of neighborhoods and communities.  Rather, what becomes interesting in modern 
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research is how such processes continue to matter and also how they have changed 
(Sampson, 2012).   
Neighborhood Measurement 
Although neighborhoods are thought of as physical units, the exact method in 
which they are defined and measured has varied across social science research.  The 
choice of how to measure a neighborhood is critical; its operationalization can impact the 
conclusions drawn about causal mechanisms at work (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Hipp, 
2007; Kirk and Laub, 2010).  Studies have used blocks, block groups, census tracts, zip 
codes, and many others as proxies for neighborhoods, the decision of measurement often 
being one of necessity given the data available (Morenoff, Sampson, and Gannon-
Rowley, 2002).  A typical strategy involves gathering and summing the data obtained 
from individuals within households in a particular area.  However, as Elliott and 
colleagues (2006: 298) have said, “theory, not convenience should drive our definitions 
of what constitutes a neighborhood.” 
Hunter and Suttles (1972) contributed to the conceptualization of neighborhoods 
by stating that there are four levels which can be used to measure behavior, each having 
its own mechanisms.  The first and smallest level is Local Networks, which they 
generally limit to study at the block face.  The second level is what they call Defended 
Neighborhoods, referring to the smallest possible unit with a recognizable identity.  The 
third level is called Community of Limited Liability; these are areas that are large enough 
to be recognized by official sources such as the government.  And finally, the fourth and 
largest level of groupings is called Expanded Community of Limited Liability.  These 
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units are defined and utilized for gathering external resources for the area.  In 
criminology research, while some have suggested that aggregating crime to the block 
level is preferred (Hipp, 2007), most researchers examine neighborhoods using an 
aggregation of data beginning at the census tract level, placing most analyses in the 
Defended Neighborhood or Community of Limited Liability categories. 
Measurement of Neighborhood-Level Effects 
 Exactly how one should capture effects at the neighborhood level also has little 
consensus within the criminological literature.  One popular method involves collecting 
individual-level data and then aggregating their responses up to the neighborhood level.  
A potential problem with this technique is the potential for same-source bias.  Such bias 
is problematic because individuals report on their personal impressions and opinions, and 
have difficulty discussing characteristics of the neighborhood in general without biasing 
their results with their own personal experiences.  Thorndike (1920: 28) referred to this 
problem as “the constant error of the ‘halo’”.  What has become preferred in 
criminological research (and social science in general) is gathering an independent 
sample (Kirk and Laub, 2010). 
A modern method of measuring neighborhood-level mechanisms suggested by 
Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) is what they call ‘ecometrics,’ where neighborhood 
processes are systematically considered as ecological phenomena.  They contend that 
approaching the study of neighborhood-level effects from an ecometric approach allows 
for a distinction between processes at several layers.  In this way, measures of 
neighborhood mechanisms such as social ties (Morenoff et al., 2001), collective efficacy 
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(Sampson et al., 1997), and social capital (Morenoff et al., 2001; Rose and Clear, 1998) 
have been collected and examined for their relationship to crime and neighborhood 
dynamics. 
 Studies on neighborhood-level analysis of crime have tapped into a variety of data 
sources to gather such independent samples.  For example, Tita, Petras, and Greenbaum 
(2006) used a combination of census and housing data tracking characteristics of 
residences, such as number of bedrooms and bathrooms, age of the residence, and 
amenities (air conditioning, fireplace, etc.) to examine crime and residential choice in 
Columbus, Ohio.  To capture citizen participation in neighborhood organizations, Ohmer 
and Beck (2006) collected survey data from four neighborhood organizations in 
Pittsburgh.  Examining neighborhood-level deprivation and collective efficacy, Odgers 
and colleagues (2009) utilized data from a longitudinal twin study in England and Wales 
where people living in the same neighborhood as the participants were administered an 
independent survey.  The current study utilizes data from the Project on Human 
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) in which a community survey was 
administered in 1994-95 and 2001-02.  The benefit of this data collection over prior 
studies is the number of neighborhoods in the analysis (343).  This is beneficial because 
similar neighborhood-level analyses in other cities have often yielded a much smaller 
number of neighborhoods for comparison.
6
 
 In criminology, neighborhood-level effects are investigated to determine if crime 
varies systematically by such characteristics across neighborhoods.  Structural 
                                                          
6
 For example, Taylor and Covington’s (1988) study of Baltimore includes only 66 neighborhoods.  Green 
et al.’s (1998) examination of New York City includes 45 community districts for analysis. 
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characteristics such as poverty, mobility, and heterogeneity are examined in their relation 
to crime, the presence of physical disorder, and measures of social disorder (Hipp, 2007).  
While many studies have demonstrated that certain structural characteristics promote 
higher crime, they often vary significantly in their level of aggregation.  This is 
particularly true in research examining gentrification and crime.  Neighborhoods are 
operationalized either using zip codes (Van Wilsem et al., 2006), census tracts 
(Covington and Taylor, 1989), or by larger community areas such as police districts 
(McDonald, 1986). 
 If research on gentrification and crime can continue, it is vital that researchers 
base the measurement and aggregation of neighborhoods on theoretically sound 
reasoning.  This will enable conclusions from a variety of studies to be compared across 
cities and over time.  The current study utilizes the PHDCN’s operationalization of 
neighborhood clusters as a preferable unit of analysis for a few reasons.  Their definition 
of a neighborhood complements prior research definitions in its focus on physical space, 
and by aggregating to a slightly larger scale than census tracts, this operationalization of 
neighborhoods takes into account the possibility that residents from these clusters will 
share similar public space, have chances to interact with each other in the area, and will 
distinguish their neighborhood area from those around it.  These clusters were also not 
created out of convenience, but constructed to represent ecologically meaningful units 
(Sampson et al., 1997).  Given the development of neighborhood measurement in prior 
research, this method of distinguishing neighborhoods seems appropriate to examine 




CHAPTER FOUR   NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL SOCIAL CONTROL AND GROUP 
THREAT 
 In the 1830s, Guerry and Quetelet became the first scientists to apply empirical 
analysis to what many considered social problems.  Using the newly published official 
crime statistics from the French Compte géneralé, their work ushered in a new era for 
social scientists to look at social phenomena, including crime, and study them 
scientifically (Lindesmith and Levin, 1937).  In particular, what these ‘moral statisticians’ 
recognized was the geographic regularity of crime statistics, and their tendency to 
fluctuate along with other problems such as poverty, infant mortality, and mental illness.  
Even at a time when phrenology, feeblemindedness, and physiognomy were taking root, 
these scholars were laying the foundations for a more sociological explanation for 
criminal behavior.   
In this chapter, I discuss the development and research within the framework of 
neighborhood-level social control.  I begin with a description of its origins, move into the 
early Chicago School, and then move on to an assessment of this research in the modern 
era (1980s – present).  A review of the concept of collective efficacy and research 
investigating it will follow, and this chapter will conclude with a discussion of the 
research on racial and ethnic threat that (ultimately) will be tied into the collective 
efficacy and control framework. 
Overview and Historical Development  
 The origins of the concept of social control are often attributed to Emile 
Durkheim.  He wrote that crime is a necessary element of human societies because 
establishing certain acts as criminal helps individuals to understand the boundaries of 
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appropriate behavior (Durkheim, 1895).  In his famous book Suicide (1897), Durkheim 
introduced an implicit assumption about human nature which is subsequently present in 
all control theories in criminology.  He stated that individuals who are in weakened 
groups in society are vulnerable because they only rely upon their own personal desires 
and interests in guiding their behavior (Durkheim, 1897).  The assumption, therefore, is 
that human beings are naturally self-serving and hedonistic; they must be controlled by 
societal rules and norms to keep from committing crime.  George Herbert Mead is 
another early scholar to discuss the concept and origins of social control in individuals.  
He argued that social control “will depend on the degree to which the individual does 
assume the attitudes of those in the group who are involved with him in his social 
activities” (Mead, 1925: 476).  While some scholars developed criminological theories 
centering on the influence of individual-level mechanisms to establish social control 
(Hirschi, 1969; Reiss, 1951; Toby, 1957), scholars also examined how social control is 
both strengthened and weakened by mechanisms at the neighborhood level.  
The pioneering work of scholars at the University of Chicago in the 20
th
 century 
helped to establish the importance of social control mechanisms in the study of crime.  
The concept of social disorganization developed from these origins, and interest in this 
neighborhood quality set off what has now been almost a century of research in 
neighborhoods and crime.  Social disorganization theory emerged during the early 20
th
 
century, the earliest research being conducted in Chicago (Shaw and McKay, 1942; 
Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918; Thrasher, 1927).  During this period, the city of Chicago 
was undergoing a massive population increase due to an influx of immigrants flocking to 
the urban center.  Population estimates from the 1900 and 1920 Chicago census show that 
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the population increased from 1.7 million to 3.4 million, a 200% increase in just thirty 
years.
7
 Scholars grew interested in the outcomes of having such a heterogeneous 
population living in such disadvantaged conditions. 
 Thrasher’s (1927) examination of gangs in Chicago introduced the concept of 
social disorganization when describing neighborhoods with persistent gang activity.  
According to his study of over 1,300 gangs, he concluded that the source of gang 
formation is disorganization within a community leading to unmet needs for local youth.  
Gangs are not organized to commit delinquent acts, according to Thrasher, they commit 
crime because they have no adult supervision and are free of control.  In this way, 
Thrasher introduced a pure control theory at the neighborhood level, and suggested that 
community organization is crucial to inhibit stable levels of youth gang crime and 
delinquency. 
Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay continued crime scholars’ interest in 
neighborhood-level explanations for crime by framing cities as spatially pathological. 
Their original theory (1942) was a mixed model including elements of control and 
cultural transmission.  Initially tapping into the work of human ecologists such as Park 
and Burgess (1925) they observed that a particular area in Chicago (the ‘zone in 
transmission’) was characterized by stable and high levels of poverty, residential 
instability, ethnic heterogeneity, and disproportionate amounts of crime.  By 
documenting the delinquency rates in Chicago over several decades, Shaw and McKay 
found that this stability existed despite the changing composition of the area, and they 
characterized such neighborhoods as having social disorganization, meaning these 
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 Retrieved from the United States Census Bureau (www.census.gov) on May 16, 2013. 
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neighborhoods were unable to realize common values or solve community problems 
(Shaw and McKay, 1942).  In short, in the origins of social disorganization theory the 
neighborhoods, and not the people within them, were criminogenic. 
 Social control elements play a primary role in Shaw and McKay’s explanation of 
stable crime patterns in neighborhoods.  Specifically, Shaw and McKay claim that social 
disorganization leads to a weakening of the community’s ability to exert informal social 
control; few people within this neighborhood attempt to prevent or interfere with 
problems as they arise in the community.  This environment, lenient on supervision and 
control, makes adolescents and teenagers within the community feel that they are free to 
commit delinquent and criminal acts.  They can vandalize property, shoplift from local 
shops, and get into scuffles without fear of sanction.  In this way, Shaw and McKay’s 
theory of social disorganization has a strong element of social control; it is only when 
there is a breakdown in the informal social control elements of a community that 
delinquency and crime flourish (Shaw and McKay, 1942). 
 In conjunction with his work developing social disorganization theory, Clifford 
Shaw also began the Chicago Area Project in 1932.  This project installed neighborhood 
centers which were run by residents, and the goal of the centers was coordinating 
resources for the community and sponsor activity programs (Shaw and McKay, 1969).  
The Chicago Area Project continues to operate, but its effectiveness at reducing crime 
and delinquency was never carefully assessed, leading some scholars to assume that it did 
not have a strong impact on crime (Kobrin, 1959; Lundman, 1976; Miller, 1962).  
Nevertheless, its mission of community building and mobilizing low-income residents to 
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take responsibility for their neighborhood has resulted in numerous youth, career, and 
community programming. 
Modern-Era Research (1980s – present) 
 The Chicago Area Project’s failure to demonstrate a preventative effect on 
delinquency contributed to a general decline in popularity of social disorganization 
theory in the 1950s and 1960s.  There were also several critiques pertaining to the 
theoretical framework itself.  First, critics took issue with the emphasis on group 
dynamics; it was thought that explanations at the neighborhood-level were too 
deterministic.  At a time when self-report and survey methodology were in vogue, which 
indicated that crime was not restricted to particular urban areas, it is perhaps not 
surprising that scholars were losing interest in neighborhood-level effects.  Second, the 
stability of city development and crime levels were not the same after the Second World 
War.  European immigrants were no longer the majority.   
Bursik and Webb (1982) specifically examined this aspect of the original theory 
by examining turnover in Chicago neighborhoods in the 1940s and 1950s.  While they 
concluded that the residential succession argument – that high crime persists despite 
population turnover – was supported in the 1940s, it was not supported with data from the 
1950s.  A third criticism pertained to the measurement of social disorganization.  
Essentially, critics took issue with prior studies for not measuring social disorganization 
independent of crime.  These studies were criticized for tautological reasoning, defining 
social disorganization by the effect it was believed to cause.  According to critics, the 
concept of social disorganization was still a ‘black box’ which needed to be unpacked 
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and measured separately from its causes or effects.  Finally, scholars disagreed as to the 
critical theoretical argument to be made in social disorganization theory.  In her 1978 
evaluation of the theory, Ruth Kornhauser raised the point that there are two main 
arguments in the theory, social disorganization and cultural transmission.  When pressed, 
Shaw and McKay concluded that the cultural transmission element was the critical 
element responsible for stable crime in these disorganized areas (Bernard, Snipes, and 
Gerould, 2010), but Kornhauser thought this conflicted with the process of their 
argument, arguing that the causal ordering of the theory suggests that delinquent 
subcultures can only emerge in neighborhoods that are already disorganized (Kornhauser, 
1978).   
 With Kornhauser’s book came a resurgence of interest in social disorganization, 
and in the 1980s it was dubbed a neighborhood or community control explanation (a.k.a 
neighborhood control theory).  The essentials of Shaw and McKay’s theory remained; 
when a community is impoverished, racially and ethnically diverse, and has high 
residential turnover, it will experience difficulty coming together to form relationships 
and solve problems.  Kornhauser (1978) evaluated the social disorganization framework 
and concluded that moving forward the focus of the theory should be on the control 
aspects of communities, and not the cultural transmission process.  Rather than continue 
to measure social disorganization by macrosocial structures (e.g. poverty), the suggestion 
was to examine the actual mechanisms by which these factors facilitate the microsocial 
control of residents (Kornhauser, 1978).   
 In the 1980s several studies identified neighborhood processes which may impact 
crime.  One of the most important advancements to neighborhood control theory came 
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with the work of Bursik (1999) and Bursik and Grasmick (1993), where a systemic model 
of neighborhood social control was first explored.  Targeting the criticism that the 
concept of social disorganization is a ‘black box’ that has yet to be appropriately 
measured, they focused on the importance of developing strong social ties to establishing 
effective informal and formal social control.  The choice to apply a systemic approach 
came from a desire to more easily differentiate social disorganization from ecological 
processes, and also from crime and delinquency.  Based on the assumption that residents 
share a common goal of wanting to live in an area free of crime, they posited that 
neighborhood characteristics such as poverty, heterogeneity, and instability impact both 
primary and secondary relationship networks.  Disruption of these networks can 
subsequently compromise the neighborhood’s ability to access public (law enforcement, 
local government), parochial (less intimate, secondary sources), and private 
(intimate/family relationships) sources of control.  In Neighborhoods and Crime, Bursik 
and Grasmick (1993) stated that crime rates represent the outcome of group dynamics 
operating at the neighborhood level.  They sought to reformulate social disorganization to 
emphasize how neighborhood life is shaped by the structure of different social networks 
with connections both within the community and between the community and external 
sources.  In a test of this theory, Bursik (1999) examined Oklahoma City residents and 
mechanisms of social control.  He found that the perception of being embedded within 
private and parochial networks was positively associated with long-time residence in the 
area and the perception that residents are similar to themselves. 
Prior to Bursik and Gramick’s (1993) book examining different levels of social 
control, scholars were also extending neighborhood control theory to examine the 
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different dimensions of social control in a systemic model.  Robert Sampson (1988) 
introduced a multilevel systemic model in his examination of British Crime Survey data.  
He argued that prior research neglected the macro-social factors involved in community 
social organization as well as the effect of community-level factors on individual 
behavior.  In short, at the community level, he predicted that neighborhoods with high 
residential stability will have dense friendship networks, strong collective attachment, 
and more social activity.  At the individual level, he predicted that factors such as length 
of residence will increase their social ties, attachment, and participation in the 
community, all of which would increase informal social control.  Results supported his 
hypotheses and led to a follow-up article with W. Byron Goves, where they introduced an 
updated systemic model of social disorganization (Sampson and Groves, 1989). 
In this updated model, Sampson and Groves (1989) identified community 
dimensions of social disorganization which could be explicitly measured.  As a systemic 
model, their focus was on how “social ties are embedded within ecological, institutional, 
and normative community structures.” (Sampson, 1991:45)  Specifically, they asserted 
that sparse friendship networks, the presence of unsupervised teenage peer groups, and 
low participation in community organizations were all dimensions indicating a 
community is socially disorganized.  In this way, the dimensions of social disorganization 
were distinguished from crime and delinquency.  This new model of neighborhood 
control, shown in Figure 1 below, suggests that neighborhood conditions such as poverty, 
heterogeneity, mobility, urbanization, and family disruption may have a small direct 
effect on crime and delinquency, but they also impact these community conditions which 




Again using British Crime Survey (BCS) data, which was a 1982 self-report 
victimization survey of 10,905 randomly selected residents (aged 16 and over) from 
across Great Britain, results showed clear support for the authors’ updated model of 
neighborhood control theory.  The study found that the level of unsupervised teenage 
peer groups had the largest effect on victimization.  It also found that less extensive 
community ties are associated with more victimization.  Sampson and Groves’ 
hypotheses were further supported in the finding that none of the exogenous factors 
(poverty, heterogeneity, stability) have direct effects; they are largely mediated by 
unsupervised peer groups (Sampson and Groves, 1989: 792).  In a follow-up examination 
of this model, Sampson (1991) more closely examines residential stability and its impact 
on the formation of community friendships, developing acquaintanceships, and stranger 
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recognition.  Using the 1984 BCS data, he found that the more friend and acquaintance 
relationships and the less anonymity in a community, the more cohesive and satisfied the 
community.  A later test of 1994 BCS data replicating Sampson and Groves (1989) 
supported the model again, this time the community dimensions mediated the effects of 
the structural characteristics even more than in the original study (Lowenkamp, Cullen, 
and Pratt, 2003).   
The shift in these systemic models away from the traditional conceptualization of 
social disorganization was necessary for researchers to move away from tautological 
measurements of the concept.  However, a lingering problem in these early systemic 
models was the importance placed on strong social ties in promoting informal social 
control (Sampson, 2012).  Several criticisms have been raised pertaining to this element.  
First, some scholars have suggested that strong ties within a community may have no 
impact on improving resources or social control (Wilson, 1996).  Second, the strength of 
social networks in place for illicit purposes (such as drug dealing and gang networks) 
may do little to improve the community.  In a recent examination of PHDCN and 
homicide data from the 1990s, Browning and colleagues (2004) found that social 
networks may increase the social capital of offenders.  The final criticism stems from the 
influential paper by Mark Granovetter (1973) about the usefulness of weak social ties.  In 
short, the ability of a community or community members to gain access to resources, 
jobs, housing, (etc.) may depend on communication within loose, wide social networks 
where the ties are weak but nonetheless effective at relaying information.  This is 
important to the neighborhood control perspective because it has traditionally operated 
under the assumption that dense, strong social ties matter.  In fact, it may be that these are 
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not always predictive of strong community social control; knowing your neighbors a little 
may be just as effective as knowing them very well.  Addressing some of the lingering 
problems with the importance of social ties, Sampson and colleagues (1997) discussed an 
alternative explanation with their introduction of the concept of collective efficacy. 
Collective Efficacy 
 In 1938, sociologist Louis Wirth described urbanism and its impact on our way of 
life.  In this paper, he famously described the fact that in most urban areas people know 
very little about their neighbors.  According to his now classic paper, “The bonds of 
kinship, of neighborliness… are likely to be absent or, at best, relatively weak.” (Wirth, 
1938: 11)  With this background, and given the difficulty reconciling the importance of 
social ties in systemic models of neighborhood control, the next evolution of 
neighborhood control came with a theory proposed by Sampson and colleagues (1997) 
which they titled ‘collective efficacy.’ 
 The authors’ choice to publish the introductory article for their theory in Science 
magazine is worth mentioning, because this is not a traditional academic journal for 
criminological theory.  A brief survey of the current issue reveals that article topics 
include neuroscience, chemistry, archaeology, infectious diseases, and atmosphere 
science.
8
  One reason for this choice of publication could have been to broaden the range 
of readership, which would have otherwise been primarily restricted to criminology and 
criminal justice students, researchers, and professors in an academic journal such as 
Criminology.  Similar to Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) decision to introduce their ‘broken 
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 Science 347: 1169 - 1284.  Retrieved from www.sciencemag.org/content/current on March 14, 2015.   
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windows’ theory in The Atlantic magazine, the decision to introduce collective efficacy 
in this manner led to the article being widely read and discussed in subsequent years by a 
wide range of interested parties. 
Collective efficacy is a concept that encompasses two general qualities of an area, 
social cohesion (the “collectivity”) and shared expectations for social control (the 
“efficacy”).  In this theory, the requirement for dense social ties to produce social control 
is deemphasized and it is a working trust, and not friendship, which can be enough to 
produce this collective efficacy in a community (Sampson, 2012).  Social ties can 
produce collective efficacy, but they are not a requirement as they are with concepts like 
social capital.  This is a critical point of differentiation from prior research which largely 
assumed that strong social ties are necessary and protective factors for communities.  
Sampson (2012) has since elaborated on this point, drawing on recent research which 
suggests that strong social ties are not necessarily always a good thing for communities, 
but can sometimes be criminogenic forces (Browning et al., 2004). 
Originally the term ‘collective efficacy’ was defined as a linkage of mutual social 
trust and cohesion, and shared willingness and expectation that neighbors will intervene 
to solve problems and exercise informal social control (Sampson et al., 1997).  In their 
initial examination of this concept, the authors speculated that collective efficacy is 
associated with a reduction in violence, and they used 1995 survey data from Chicago 
neighborhoods to examine this question.  They found support for this hypothesis; in 
neighborhoods where measures of collective efficacy are high there tends to be lower 
incidence of violence.  Importantly, this factor mediates the effect of neighborhood-level 
structural factors such as poverty and residential mobility (Sampson et al., 1997).   
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As shown in Figure 2, the most recent model of collective efficacy suggests that 
structural neighborhood-level characteristics do have an impact on crime and disorder.  
However, the theoretical model suggests that characteristics such as concentrated 
disadvantage, mobility, and heterogeneity in a community are important because they 
weaken and disrupt network ties (Sampson, 2012).  Collective efficacy is also 
acknowledged as being influenced by these factors, but as the model suggests, it has its 
own strong and direct effect. 
 
Follow-up studies examining collective efficacy have continued to show support 
for its importance in predicting neighborhood crime patterns.  It has been found that the 
level of collective efficacy in a neighborhood can account for levels of crime and disorder 
(Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999).  Scholars also contend that high collective efficacy in 
one neighborhood may have benefits to nearby areas.  The suggestion is that it may 
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‘ooze’ over into nearby places, so they too enjoy a lower level of crime (Morenoff, 
Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001).  Recent research has also examined collective 
efficacy’s ability to impede subsequent breakdowns in neighborhood social control.  
Empirically, the importance of collective efficacy in explaining crime within 
neighborhoods has been demonstrated both in the U.S. and internationally (Sampson, 
2012).  In their meta-analysis of over two hundred examinations of neighborhood crime 
rates spanning several decades, Pratt and Cullen (2005) found that collective efficacy had 
a mean correlation of -0.303 (scale of -1 to 1) which they describe as a robust finding.  
Importantly, they conclude that collective efficacy’s explanatory power trumps other 
commonly identified causal factors such as poverty.   
While collective efficacy is often measured as a macro-level concept, it likely also 
operates at the individual level.  Prior research has already demonstrated that individuals 
living within neighborhoods high in collective efficacy are more likely to benefit from 
authoritative parenting (Simons et al., 2005).  Additionally, collective efficacy has been 
found to have effects on adolescent behaviors; neighborhoods high in collective efficacy 
have been found to have less unstructured socializing by youths (Maimon and Browning, 
2010). 
 Another neighborhood-level process that has been examined independently from 
collective efficacy is the impact of minority and group threat in a community on crime 
rates.  In the following section, I will discuss the prior literature on this area and 
introduce a way to combine this perspective with the concept of collective efficacy.  
These two concepts have been examined independently, but the current research will 
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show that the two may interact and should therefore be considered and examined 
together.  There has been a recent trend in neighborhood-level research to revive a 
discussion of cultural mechanisms.  In the current study, I include a measure perceived 
neighborhood change to represent group threat dynamics, and use it to interact with the 
gentrification process in affecting crime rates over time. 
 
Group and Minority Threat Perspective and Research 
 Group threat has been examined for its impact on a variety of outcomes.  One 
body of literature suggests that out-group prejudice, when racially charged, can explain 
punitive attitudes towards the minority group in question (Ousey and Unnever, 2012).  In 
several empirical examinations of prejudice and intolerance toward minority groups, it 
has been revealed that these same areas also are the most supportive of punitive penalites 
for offenders in general (Hurwtiz and Peffley, 2005; Ousey and Unnever, 2012; Unnever 
and Cullen, 2010).  Scholars have also begun to examine this process internationally, 
comparing minority threat and prejudice across Europe (Lahav, 2004; Quillian, 1995).  
For the purposes of the current study, the focus will be on research examining racial and 
minority threat dynamics at the neighborhood level. 
 Group-threat theory suggests that when the majority group in an area perceives 
threats from a minority group, prejudice and hostility towards this minority group will 
have a variety of negative outcomes (King and Wheelock, 2007).  In Herbert Blumer’s 
classic article about this phenomenon, he suggests that within areas groups develop a 
kind of hierarchical social position which makes group members at the top believe they 
58 
 
are entitled to most of the area’s resources and opportunities.  According to his theory, 
when another group threatens to disrupt this dynamic and use the community’s resources, 
prejudice and intolerance can increase to the point of action (Blumer, 1958).  This 
process is thought to become amplified when the minority group presence increases or 
they mobilize and attempt to seize additional community resources and privileges 
(Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 1988; Bonilla-Silva, 1997, 2006).  Building off Blumer’s original 
piece, Blalock (1967) contended that the size of the minority group plays a large role in 
the perceived threat they pose; as their relative size increases in a community, the 
majority will become more concerned and threatened about the social and financial 
resources at stake.  For Blalock, the assumption is that the majority group tends to be 
white, and the growing minority presence in the community is black.  Subsequent 
research has built upon this racially charged process, finding that white majority residents 
begin resorting to longstanding racial stereotypes to characterize their black neighbors as 
their presence increases (Van Ausdale and Feagin, 2002).  
 The majority of the literature on group threat examines this dynamic looking at a 
white majority reacting to the invasion of a black minority group presence.  Levine and 
Campbell (1972) studied levels of violence and minority presence, and concluded that 
when the minority (black) presence is larger, there are a greater number of attacks on this 
population.  Bobo (1988) emphasized that white residents prefer to enjoy a relative 
“social distance” from minority residents, and when this presence increases they feel 
threatened that this social distance will close.  Similar studies have confirmed that while 
white residents claim to support integrated communities, they still prefer to be in the 
majority and thus receiving the majority of resources and privileges (Bobo, Shurman, and 
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Steeh, 1986; Clark, 1991; Frey, 1979).  Research on the concept of ‘defended 
neighborhoods’ taps into this group threat dynamic, and data have found that when crime 
is directed against racial and ethnic minorities this tends to take place in neighborhoods 
where a recent influx of minority residents has taken place (Green, Strolovitch, and 
Wong, 1998).    
 In subsequent analyses, one possibility that has been explored is the idea that 
group threat may have a ‘tipping point.’  That is, while initial increases in the minority 
presence create conflict and problems, there is actually a curvilinear relationship in place; 
eventually if the minority presence becomes large enough it is suggested that feelings of 
prejudice, interracial conflict, and racially motivated crimes will decline (Blau, 1977; 
Horowitz, 1985; Sampson, 1984).  However, just how much of a minority presence is 
required to reach this tipping point is up for debate.  In Donald Horowitz’s examination 
of competition and change across several countries he discusses what happens when an 
ethnic minority eclipses the original group in power, suggesting that conflict arises when 
a new majority is reached (Horowtiz, 1972).  Peter Blau’s 1977 book, Inequality and 
Heterogeneity, introduces a macro sociological theory which describes the social 
associations between groups; he explains that the varying levels of particular groups 
affect the dynamics and relationships between groups who diverge in their social 
structural position.  While contact between groups may bolster intergroup relations, Blau 
also suggests that “the very conditions that foster social integration of various groups and 
strata into a coherent social structure simultaneously precipitate frequent interpersonal 
conflicts among members (Blau, 1977: 113).  Sampson (1984) conducted a follow-up 
study to test Blau’s theory using National Crime Survey (NCS) data from 1973-1978.  He 
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found that there is some evidence for the curvilinear relationship, but cautions that it is 
still difficult to determine if the motivation behind interracial crime is group-threat and 
conflict (Sampson, 1984). 
 In gentrifying neighborhoods, changes are made to both the physical appearance 
of the area and the residential composition.  However, across neighborhoods and context 
gentrification is not always received consistently by the long-term residents.  At times, 
historical accounts reveal a significant degree of resistance to gentrification.  For 
example, in the Tompkins Square area of New York City gentrification efforts underway 
in the late 1980s were met with protests and demonstrations, occasionally requiring 
police action (Jacobs, 1998).  In Harlem, the “boutiquing” process (upscale designer 
stores replacing local retailers) began as early as the 1970s, and the use of public space 
began to change.  Neighbors who used to feel comfortable congregating on the street to 
socialize began to get ushered away by local law enforcement at the request of merchants 
(Freeman, 2006; Jackson, 2005).  Similar anecdotal accounts of gentrification being met 
with resistance and anger have been found in Chicago newspaper coverage of changes in 
areas such as Bronzeville and Pilsen.  The changes that accompany gentrification may 
have obvious benefits to the growing middle class population in the area, but may also 
marginalize and unsettle the poor, longstanding population (Jacobs, 1998).  It is this 
phenomenon that has the potential to cause the long-standing residents of a gentrifying 
community to feel that their neighborhood is not actually making changes for the better. 
 At the individual level, it is likely that perceptions of group threat work to impact 
attitudes and opinions as well.  For example, research has demonstrated that individuals 
have increased perceptions of threat toward immigrant groups.  In Ousey and Unnever’s 
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(2012) examination of individuals across 27 European countries, they find that larger 
numbers of racial and ethnic minority groups is associated with more negative attitudes 
by individuals toward these groups, and it is also associated with a preference for more 
severe punishments for offenders.  It is likely, therefore, that within these neighborhoods 
in Chicago perceptions of threat and dissatisfaction with the presence of perceived ‘out-
groups’ may be working at the individual level to impact feelings of prejudice, 
discrimination, and desire for punitive treatment. 
 In the current study, the concept of perceived neighborhood change is introduced 
as a possible moderating force associated with the effect of gentrification on crime.  If 
residents feel threatened, and perceive that changes in the environment and people in 
their area are not for the better, this implies as sense of unrest and discomfort.  It is 
suggested in this study that this may cause crime to get worse, and not improve with the 
new developments.  Survey measures in the current project will shed light on whether or 




 Both collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood change are suggested as 
mechanisms which may interact with the process of gentrification in a neighborhood.  
This chapter has discussed how these concepts have been examined in prior research.  In 
this dissertation, they will be utilized as moderating mechanisms to explain the variation 
in the relationship between gentrification and crime across neighborhoods.  In Chapter 5, 
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these mechanisms are examined together to demonstrate how the suggested interactions 

















CHAPTER FIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
In her groundbreaking 1961 book The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 
Jane Jacobs argues that streets where people are occupying public space and using it 
productively will not only be safer and experience less crime, but will also be generally 
better places to live.  Throughout Jacobs’ book, she stresses that success comes from 
residents becoming invested and engaged with keeping public spaces in neighborhoods 
accessible and constantly in use.  Such an environment enhances the safety of both 
strangers and residents within an area (Jacobs, 1961).  Jacobs’ book paved that way for 
urban scholars in suggesting that it is important to understand how quality of life is 
impacted by both physical and social elements of city life.  It is certainly one goal of 
gentrification projects to improve the quality of life in neighborhoods and make them 
better places to live.  However, whether or not this is always the case, or these benefits 
are enjoyed by everyone in the area, is one of the questions that will be explored in the 
current project.  In the following chapter, the theoretical framework for the current 
project will be laid out, so that the four primary mechanisms (gentrification, collective 
efficacy, perceived neighborhood change, and crime) can come together in a logically 
consistent story.   
 First, it is important to acknowledge that the processes being investigated in the 
current project likely occur alongside one another in neighborhoods.  This simultaneity of 
processes makes it difficult to disentangle the temporal sequencing of causal events in 
this study, and this is an important limitation of the current project which will be 
discussed with more detail in the closing chapters.  However, there are theoretical 
principles which can be drawn upon to build a foundation for studying how all of these 
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processes interact and influence crime over time, and that will be the focus of the 
proceeding chapter.   
 Similar to prior research, in the current project perceived neighborhood change is 
expected to be higher when gentrification causes the demographic profile in a 
neighborhood to dramatically change.  Several studies have demonstrated this (Bobo, 
1988; Van Ausdale and Feagin, 2002) but this work has largely been done examining 
areas that begin predominantly white and experience a rise in the number of racial-ethnic 
minority residents.  In the current study, this same theoretical relationship is being 
examined where a variety of racial-ethnic groups are predominant in neighborhoods, and 
it is suggested that perceived neighborhood change dynamics will manifest in similar 
ways.  It is suggested that the issue is one of a disruption to the homogeneity of an area; 
regardless of the racial or ethnic groups in question.  For example, if gentrification in a 
historically African American neighborhood results in an influx of middle-class African 
American residents moving into the area, it is not expected that perceived neighborhood 
change would be as high as it might be if the incoming residents were middle-class and 
white.  I ground this expectation in several historical accounts of gentrification in Harlem 
in New York City, and Bronzeville in Chicago.  In Harlem, a large influx of middle-class 
African American residents took place in the early 20
th
 century.  Ethnographers have 
posited that these incoming residents sought to preserve the historical neighborhood 
culture, and so their moving into the area did not cause tension or neighborhood discord 
(Freeman, 2005).   
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 In Chicago, the Bronzeville area began experiencing gentrification in a similar 
manner; effort was taken by developers to entice middle-class black residents into the 
area.   
Developers who have gone into Bronzeville have explicitly marketed 
housing there to blacks, both because the community wanted to keep its 
historic identity and because there were doubts whites would have moved 
in. But the hope was that even if whites did not arrive with moving trucks, 
they would come down to hear the Blues. (Badger, 2012: 6) 
The gentrification processes in Bronzeville coincided with the demolition of the public 
housing projects, which paved the way for redevelopment of the area (Hyra, 2008).   
However, citing the literature on racial and ethnic threat, when significant 
demographic shifts happen in a neighborhood over time, this can be associated with rises 
in varying levels of crime and disorder (Blau, 1977; Sampson, 1984).  We have evidence 
that this takes place when a traditionally white, middle-class neighborhood experience an 
influx of minority residents (Levine and Campbell, 1972) so the current study represents 
a logical extension of prior research to examine whether or not this mechanism is 
experienced with less traditional groups in these roles.  Therefore, the first element of this 
theoretical model implies that gentrification may be perceived as threatening if the 
process changes the neighborhood’s traditional demographic profile.  Several studies 
have suggested that there is an overall negative association between gentrification and 
crime (O’Sullivan, 2005; Papachristos et al., 2011).  While gentrifying neighborhoods 
with no perception of group threat may experience a decrease in crime, it is suggested in 
the current study that gentrifying neighborhoods where perceived neighborhood change 
exists may experience higher rates of violence and victimization.  Prior research has 
stated that one source of conflict in changing neighborhoods is the fear that new residents 
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will take over community resources (Clark, 1991; Frey, 1979; Green et al., 1998).  It 
stands to reason therefore, that a neighborhood experiencing gentrification may see rises 
in violence and victimization as a result of conflicts that arise out of this competition for 
space and resources.  If public spaces traditionally used for the leisure activities of 
longtime residents are taken over by the gentrifying population, this may lead to physical 
altercations, or the destruction of property.  If the gentrifying population has a larger 
volume of automobiles per household, and they begin to take over most of the public 
parking, vandalism and auto theft may ensue.  
Examples of this theoretical process in action can be found in archival newspaper 
accounts of the gentrification processes as they unfolded in Chicago neighborhoods in the 
1990s.  In the West Loop neighborhood, Fulton Street Market was a place for local food 
producers and craftsmen to sell their merchandise for decades, but real estate developers 
fought to rezone the area to make way for upscale loft condominium conversions.  The 
local merchants felt that this move was effectively putting them out and threatening their 
businesses, and several instances of violence and property damage were the results of old 
and new residents clashing (Mendell, 1999).  An example of gentrification causing 
longtime residents to feel ‘pushed’ out of the area comes from descriptions of the changes 
experienced in the northern neighborhood of Bucktown. In the late 1980s and early 90s 
this area experienced an influx of artists purchasing large spaces for lofts and studios.  A 
longtime resident of Bucktown was interviewed about these changes in the Chicago 
Tribune: 
I like the way this neighborhood is – mostly Puerto Rican – and I wish it 
would stay that way.  All these families have been here for years and 
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they’re going to be pushed into another low-income neighborhood. 
(Lauerman 1992: 1) 
Such threats to both neighborhood culture and neighborhood resources parallel 
the problems discussed in prior research that connect group threat to crime.  Therefore, an 
important point of the current investigation will be to examine whether or not the 
connection between gentrification and crime is moderated by levels of perceived 
neighborhood change. 
This project also incorporates theoretical principles of collective efficacy into its 
explanation of crime.  Incorporating collective efficacy into the theoretical framework 
implies a few assumptions, which bear explanation.  First, one assumption is that 
neighborhoods rely on social control mechanisms to inhibit crime, and while forces at the 
individual level and a more macro-level may have some impact, it is these neighborhood-
level factors which play a significant role in the levels of crime over time (Sampson, 
Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997).  Second, this project assumes that collective efficacy is a 
quality which plays a strong role in a neighborhood’s ability to maintain informal social 
control and lower crime.  As a construct, collective efficacy’s importance to crime levels 
in neighborhoods has been demonstrated in cities in the United States and abroad 
(Mazerolle, Wickes, and McBroom, 2010; Zhang, Messner, and Liu, 2007).  While this 
neighborhood-level factor has not been examined for its interaction with gentrification 
processes, there is a compelling theoretical rationale for why it may be important to the 
relationship. Collective efficacy is thought of as a dynamic quality in neighborhoods that 
is partly endogenous, or contingent on the challenges at hand (Sampson, 2012).  Rapid 
turnover and changes to the population of a neighborhood have long been associated with 
increased crime (Bursik and Webb, 1982; Shaw and McKay, 1942), but it may be the 
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case that having a high level of collective efficacy at the start of a challenge such as 
gentrification can protect the neighborhood from harmful consequences.  
In summary, this dissertation’s theoretical perspective attempts to merge the 
theoretical concepts of collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood change with the 
process of gentrification.  Figure 3 displays the theoretical relationships between the 
primary variables of interest.  It is my hope that the current project can merge these 
theoretical perspectives together in the following ways.  First, it is suggested that 
examining gentrification for its overall impact on crime will result in a negative 
association, but this overall relationship is masking the changing impact of gentrification 
depending on contextual factors, which will be revealed once contextual factors are 
included.  When gentrification takes places and the long-standing residents in a 
neighborhood perceive this as perceived neighborhood change, this will modify the 
relationship between gentrification and crime and these neighborhoods will experience an 




Second, it is suggested that collective efficacy will moderate the relationship 
between gentrification and crime by strengthening the negative association.  For example, 
if long-standing residents of a neighborhood notice that a large turnover in their 
population has occurred, and this turnover results in a change to the composition of the 
area, it stands to reason that a neighborhood high in collective efficacy would take 
productive action (i.e. calling meetings of neighborhood associations, organizing events 
designed for residents to meet and get to know one another).  In contrast, a neighborhood 
low in collective efficacy that experiences disruptive gentrification may respond 
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negatively – where long-standing residents are dismissive and newer, more affluent 
residents seek to take control of the area and separate themselves from the longtime 
residents.   
As simultaneously occurring factors, collective efficacy and perceived 
neighborhood change also likely impact each other within neighborhoods.  Although the 
data do not allow for an examination of reciprocal effects, there are theoretical ways in 
which these processes may impact each other, and the direction and magnitude of these 
are important to consider.  In this dissertation, it is theorized that high levels of collective 
efficacy may weaken any perception of perceived neighborhood change in 
neighborhoods; thus, it is not anticipated that these two factors will be positively 
correlated with one another because collective efficacy will have a negative impact on 
perceived neighborhood change.  This prediction is based on the fact that the concept of 
collective efficacy has been linked to the ability of neighborhoods to actively solve their 
problems (Sampson, 2012; Taylor, 2002).  The tense circumstances within which group 
threat perceptions arise may not be as likely to escalate to high levels in a neighborhood 
with high collective efficacy because these neighborhoods actively engage and solve 
problems before they build.  For example, a neighborhood high in collective efficacy 
might engage with incoming residents to build a sense of cohesion and understanding 
about the expectations for shared public space.  Perhaps in areas high in collective 
efficacy neighborhood organizations reach out to incoming residents to get them to join 
these groups, making them be perceived less as outsiders or invaders.  Therefore, while 
these reciprocal effects cannot be examined in the current study, it is theorized that group 
threat is weakened by collective efficacy over time. 
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It is also theorized that group threat dynamics may serve to weaken the 
effectiveness of collective efficacy.  Several scholars have noted that the degree to which 
collective efficacy can be effective at solving problems is contingent upon neighborhood 
context (Baumer, 2002; Wells et al., 2006) and the current study argues that perceptions 
of perceived neighborhood change may be just such a neighborhood condition that 
impacts the effectiveness of collective efficacy.  Therefore, just as high levels of 
collective efficacy may weaken perceptions of perceived neighborhood change over time, 
escalating levels of perceived neighborhood change may themselves work to weaken 
collective efficacy.  It is anticipated that these conditions will have a high negative 
correlation with each other, and they each have the potential to impact each other’s effect 
on gentrification and crime in meaningful ways.  It is a limitation of the current study that 
such simultaneous and reciprocal effects cannot be properly measured; reliable data on 
these measures were only collected at one point in time.  This limitation is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Eight, along with relevant implications for future research. 
This theoretical framework establishes that these contextual factors may have 
differing effects; collective efficacy may be helpful in protecting neighborhoods from 
some of the potentially problematic outcomes of gentrification when perceived 
neighborhood change arises, but group threat forces may be harmful to gentrifying 
neighborhoods.  Therefore, it is suggested that levels of these contextual factors will 





CHAPTER SIX   RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The previous several chapters discussed the literature that serves as a foundation 
upon which this dissertation will be based.  Although many valuable and informative 
contributions have been made, there are still many questions about gentrification and 
crime that are currently unanswered.  Several puzzles have been named as key areas 
where research on gentrification and crime must go in the future (Kirk and Laub, 2010).  
In this research, I attempt to address some of these puzzles by examining the relationship 
between gentrification, crime, and informal social control, and perceived neighborhood 
change mechanisms.   
The current chapter will begin with a discussion of the hypotheses that have been 
generated from the research questions presented in the introduction of this dissertation.  It 
will then lead to a description of the data gathered from three major sources:  The Project 
on Human Development in Chicago Areas (PHDCN) – specifically, the Community 
Survey administered in 1994-95 and 2000-01, the U.S. Census, and the Chicago Transit 
Authority (CTA).  The current chapter will discuss the analyses investigating 
gentrification, crime, and contextual effects.  While the analysis of displacement effects 
will be examined using the same data sources, the corresponding methodology and 




 The first research question addresses the overall relationship between 
gentrification and crime.  In the current study, this research will build on prior research 
and examine the following hypothesis: 
H1: Gentrification will be negatively associated with the levels of perceived violence and 
victimization in neighborhoods, such that levels of these variables will decrease with 
increases in the level of gentrification in a neighborhood cluster. 
H2:  Collective efficacy will interact with gentrification at the neighborhood level and 
moderate the effect of gentrification on levels of perceived violence and victimization.  
Collective efficacy, therefore, will strengthen the negative association between 
gentrification and perceived violence and victimization. 
H3:  Perceived neighborhood change will interact with gentrification at the neighborhood 
level and moderate the effect of gentrification on levels of perceived violence and 
victimization, changing the direction of this association.  When gentrification interacts 
with high levels of perceived neighborhood change in a neighborhood, this will be 
associated with an increase in perceived violence and victimization. 
H4:  There will evidence of a spatial crime displacement effect from gentrifying 
neighborhoods to adjacent areas.   




This project uses data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago 
Neighborhoods (PHDCN), specifically data from the 1994-95 Community Survey.
9
  The 
PHDCN is an interdisciplinary study focusing on the causal pathways that lead to both 
positive and negative outcomes for children and adolescents, as well as for 
neighborhoods.  It includes data on family dynamics, schools, and neighborhoods and 
their effect on youth development (ICPSR 2013).  Survey questions taken for the current 
project include items relevant to crime, perceived neighborhood change, and items 
tapping into the concept of collective efficacy, which captures the neighborhood’s social 
cohesion and willingness to intervene to maintain social control.  In the PHDCN, 
neighborhoods were measured by placing all 866 census tracts in Chicago into 343 
neighborhood clusters.  The census tracts were originally constructed to be homogenous 
neighborhoods, making them a good starting point for neighborhood-level analysis 
(Green and Truesdell, 1937; Hipp, 2007).  The PHDCN sought to aggregate these tracts 
into neighborhood clusters, designed to be “as ecologically meaningful as possible, 
composed of geographically contiguous census tracts, and internally homogeneous on 
key census indicators.” (Sampson et al., 1997: 919).  An average neighborhood cluster 
contains about 8,000 residents, and in the 1994-95 Community survey a probability 
sample is gathered of 8,782 residents within the 343 neighborhood clusters (Kirk and 
Papachristos, 2011).  After excluding omitted responses for key variables used to 
construct the scales for collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood change, the final 
sample size for the current project was 7,739.  For the purposes of the current research 
study, the unit of analysis is the neighborhood cluster as defined in the PHDCN data.  
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The cluster which is mostly filled with Chicago’s O’Hare Airport is excluded, leaving a 
total of 342 neighborhood clusters for analysis.
10
   
It is advantageous to use data from the PHDCN Community Survey for a few 
reasons.  First, these data have been a rich source of research on collective efficacy and 
crime for almost twenty years (Sampson et al., 1997) and the structure of the survey has 
been taken and implemented in other major cities, both within the United States and 
internationally (Wickes et al., 2013).  Although these prior studies establish the 
importance of neighborhood-level effects in general, the current study contributes to this 
body of knowledge by suggesting connections between these well-established 
neighborhood mechanisms in areas of change.  Second, the PHDCN’s implementation of 
neighborhood clusters offers the possibility to consider neighborhood-level concepts, 
such as social cohesion, efficacy, and threat, because they have been constructed with 
attention paid to the composition of residents within.  For example, there are some census 
tracts in Chicago which actually cover industrial areas; places like these are not included 
as neighborhood clusters, thus preserving the idea that only neighborhoods where 
residents live are being considered. 
Chicago Transit Authority 
 Data were also gathered from archival records of the Chicago Transit Authority to 
ascertain the presence of ‘L’ train stations in each of the neighborhood clusters.  Good 
access to metro services has been identified as a leading indicator of urban gentrification 
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 One limitation in using data from 1990 on gentrification and survey data from 1994-95 for the 
neighborhood-level mechanisms is that gentrification processes have the potential to impact contextual 
mechanisms such as collective efficacy and group threat.  Therefore, it could be that the levels of these 
factors have already been altered by the gentrification process in 1994-95.  In future research, it will be 
beneficial to capture these data simultaneously across a timeframe, so that these impacts can be examined. 
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elsewhere (Turner and Snow, 2001) but this has yet to be included in an examination of 
gentrification in Chicago, so its inclusion enhances the construction of the gentrification 
measure.  To ascertain whether or not an L train station was in operation during the 
timeframe of the current project, a system map of the Chicago Transit Authority from 
1990 was examined to identify the street addresses of each of the L train stations.  These 
stations were then located within each of the neighborhood clusters, and a binary variable 
was generated (1 = L station within cluster).
11
  These data are included with the census 
data measuring gentrification in the clusters. 
 In 1993, the L system included new stops on the Orange Line, which runs from 
the downtown ‘Loop’ to Midway airport.  Neighborhoods that acquired these L train 
stations in 1993 were coded as ‘1’ in data, because their inclusion provided new public 
transportation access to these neighborhoods that may have influenced development in 
the area.  This allowed four additional neighborhoods to be coded ‘1’ as having good L 
train access. 
Measures 
A description of all variables used in the study is included in Table 1.  The following 
sections will describe the measurement of each variable in detail. 
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 I considered that an L train station directly on the border between two NCs might provide similar access 
to both neighborhoods.  In fact this only occurred three times, and in these cases I coded both clusters as 
having good L train access. 
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Table 1. Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables, PHDCN Data 




  Perceived violence Ordinal Scale Violence in past 6 months 
  
Personal victimization 
log odds Continuous Logarithmic odds of victimization 
Individual-Level Independent Variables 
  Gender 1=Female   
  Race-Ethnicity 4 Dummy Variables Black, Latino, Other, with White omitted 
  Age Continuous   
  SES Index 
% Families below poverty line, % on PA,            
% Unemployed, % female-headed households,    
% under 18 
  Years at address Continuous   
Neighborhood-Level Independent Variables   
  
Racial-Ethnic 
Composition 3 Dummy Variables 
70% A.A., 70% Latino, Mixed, with 70% 
White omitted  
  Perceived Neigh. Change Scale 3 item scale; alpha=.78 
  Gentrification Scale 6 item scale; alpha=.85 
  Collective Efficacy Scale   
 
Dependent Variables 
 In the PHDCN data there are a few potential ways to measure crime and violence.  
The first is through survey questions asking citizens to report on violent incidents that 
have happened in the neighborhood in the past six months.  The second method is to 
analyze personal victimization through a question asking participants to report on all 
violent victimization experiences while living in the neighborhood.  I examine these two 
outcomes of interest in the current study, and will report results using both measures as 
outcome variables of interest.  For a few important reasons, the current project focuses on 
perceived neighborhood violence as the primary outcome variable of interest.  One 
appealing element of this measure is its limited reporting window.  By restricting 
participants to report on violence that has occurred in the past six months only, this 
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measure is preferred because it restricts the outcome to incidents happening after 
gentrification has been measured.
12
  Another appealing reason to utilize the perceived 
violence measure is that prior research comparing results from this scale to victimization 
or homicide data as outcome measures yields comparable results.
13
  However, it will also 
be advantageous to examine victimization data, because this will be a less rare event, and 
therefore the potential for a larger range of between-neighborhood variation may be 
observed.   
The perceived violence scale is derived from survey responses to questions asking 
residents to report whether in the past six months the following actions happened: 1) How 
often was there a fight in this neighborhood in which a weapon was used? 2) How often 
was there a violent argument between neighbors? 3) [How often were there] gang fights? 
4) [How often was there] A sexual assault or rape? 5) [How often was there] A robbery 
or burglary?  Respondents were given the option to respond ‘often’ ‘sometimes’ ‘rarely’ 
or ‘don’t know’ (ICPSR 2766: 21).   
Summary scales such as this are a common method for creating factors to be used as 
outcome variables (Osgood, McMorris, and Potenza, 2002) but they are not without their 
limitations, which should be acknowledged.  By giving equal weight to each of these 
items, the implicit assumption is that they are of equal severity, which may not be the 
case (DiPietro, 2010).  This method also assumes that the questions are comprehensive in 
their capturing of all forms of the measure.  While the perceived violence measure 
                                                          
12
 While the survey question on victimization gives participants the ability to report on all incidents, prior 
research has demonstrated that for approximately 40% of those surveyed the incident they disclosed 
occurred within the past six months (see Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997: note 22). 
13
 Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) demonstrated that measuring neighborhood-level factors for 
their relationship to these three outcomes yielded comparable results.  See Table 5 (Sampson et al. 1997: 
923) for more detail. 
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captures a wide range of violent actions, it may be the case that some forms of 
neighborhood violence are being missed. 
The measure of violent victimization in the PHDCN is a dichotomous variable (1 = 
yes).  Each respondent was asked, “While you have lived in this neighborhood, has 
anyone ever used violence, such as in a mugging, fight, or sexual assault, against you or 
any member of your household anywhere in your neighborhood?”  While the respondents 
were not restricted to a particular window of time for this question, original analyses 
using restricted time frames on reported incidents gave very similar results (see Sampson 
et al., 1997: note 22).  From this variable, the logarithmic odds of victimization were 





 Building off prior research, gentrification is partially measured in this study using 
data from the 1990 Census, but the current study also incorporates data from other 
sources for a more complete consideration of the process.  The first consideration in 
identifying areas for gentrification potential in the 1990s was identifying the areas with 
low housing values.  Beginning at this point will prevent neighborhoods from being seen 
as gentrifying if, for example, they were already affluent neighborhoods and simply went 
further along that extreme.  To this end, all neighborhoods with an average home value 
                                                          
14
 The structural model mirrors that of Eqs. 4 and 5 in Sampson et al. (1997): 921. 
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below the city’s average are considered low-priced areas.
15
  In total, there were 121 
neighborhood clusters that could be defined as low-priced by this definition.   
Drawing data from the 1990 U.S. Census and the CTA, the gentrification scale 
was conducted.  To identify areas of gentrification potential in 1990, the following 
dichotomous variables were included in a summed scale of binary variables where 
responses for each neighborhood was either yes (= 1) or no: 1) [Low priced area…] 
Adjacent to a high-priced area,
1617
 2) Containing an L train station within its boundaries, 
3) With the majority (>50%) of residences having historic architecture (built before 
1940), 4) With the majority (>50%) of residences having large (5+) housing units, 5) 
With less than 20% eligible (persons 25+) with a bachelor’s degree, 6) With median 
income below the median income for the city.
18
  Responses were summed and divided by 
the total number of items in the scale; higher scores indicate a higher level of 
gentrification potential.
19
  This gentrification potential scale is modified from a similar 
scale used to measure gentrification potential by the Urban Institute in their 2001 analysis 
of Washington, DC (Turner and Snow, 2001).
20
   
                                                          
15
 In 1990 the average home value in Chicago was $110,000 (U.S. Census, 1990). 
16
 This included all areas where the home value was above the city’s average. 
17
 Median home value would likely be a more reliable method of measuring prices in these areas, as the 
average home value may be impacted by extremely affluent areas of the city.  In future research utilizing 
this scale, average home value will be replaced with median home value. 
18
 In 1990, the median family income for the city of Chicago was $30,707 (U.S. Census, 1990) 
19
 Principle components factor analysis indicated that the items load onto a single factor (eigenvalue = 3.85) 
which explains 48.3 percent of the variance in the measures.  Individual factor loadings range from .623 to 
.745. 
20
 The scale used in the current study mirrors their ‘Five Leading Indicators of the Location of Future 
Gentrification’ with the exception of a measure of recent appreciation.  For the purposes to this study, 
access to the L train was taken as a comparable measure to access to Metro stations in the study of 




There are several potential benefits to creating a scale as an estimation of 
gentrification using these measures.  First, they are all measured in the same way, and 
there are theoretical reasons for believing that all six measures are relevant to the 
underlying concept.  The gentrification scale has validity (Cronbach’s Alpha) of α= 0.85, 
which suggests that it has internal consistency, and the items included in the 
gentrification scale are appropriate for measuring gentrification potential.  Removal of 
any items in the scale did not increase the alpha level.  The mean score was .35, with 
higher scores indicating a greater level of gentrification potential in the neighborhood.  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of neighborhood clusters across the gentrification scale.  
Approximately 49 percent of the neighborhood clusters (170 clusters) scored relatively 
low on the gentrification scale (.06 to .30).  There were 34 neighborhood clusters (9.9 
percent) scoring relatively high on the scale (.75 to 1.0).   
 
It is important to verify that the gentrification scale, which uses data from 1990 to 
















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0 
Gentrification 
Figure 4:  Level of Gentrification in Neighborhood Clusters (N = 342) 
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experienced gentrification during this time period.  To verify this, data from all 342 
neighborhood clusters were examined with the 1990 and 2000 Census data.  
Neighborhoods scoring extremely high (≥ 75
th
 percentile) on the scale should have 
significantly changed on these measures, whereas neighborhoods scoring lower on the 
scale should have seen less significant changes over time.  For example, in 
neighborhoods experiencing significant gentrification, it is expected that the home value 
would increase, there would be fewer numbers of large housing units, more eligible 
residents would have bachelor’s degrees, and the median income in the area would be 
significantly higher.  However, in the neighborhoods in lower percentiles on the scale, it 
is not expected that these changes will be significant.  Table 2 presents the results of this 
verification analysis.  As predicted, neighborhoods in the 75
th
 percentile or higher on the 
gentrification scale changed in the predicted ways, but neighborhoods in the lower 
percentiles did not have significant changes to most of these indicators.  This increases 
confidence in the validity of the gentrification scale.  Although it uses 1990 data to 
predict gentrification in the coming decade, these analyses give verification that the scale 







Table 2. One-tailed T-test Comparison of Gentrification Measures from U.S 
Census (1990-2000) 
 
1990 2000   
≥ 75th percentile on scale 
  
  
Home Value (1990 adj. $) $59,326.43 $136,203.83 *** 
% Large (5+) Housing Units 67.33 29.99 *** 
% Eligible Persons with Bachelor's Degree 8.97 35.33 *** 
Median Income (1990 adj. $) $17,336.71 $51,030.40 *** 
    
  
50th - 74th percentile   
  
Home Value (1990 adj. $) $61,743.21 $65,966.77 * 
% Large (5+) Housing Units 48.25 41.42 * 
% Eligible Persons with Bachelor's Degree 15.85 19.34   




25th - 49th percentile 
  
  
Home Value (1990 adj. $) $71,487.61 $73,589.21   
% Large (5+) Housing Units 42.55 40.68   
% Eligible Persons with Bachelor's Degree 26.34 28.47   
Median Income (1990 adj. $) $34,899.00 $37,641.00   
   
  
1st - 24th percentile  
  
  
Home Value (1990 adj. $) $95,374.54 $101,255.78 * 
% Large (5+) Housing Units 15.31 14.27   
% Eligible Persons with Bachelor's Degree 34.77 36.98   
Median Income (1990 adj. $) $45,745.36 $49,678.45   
*p < .05 **p < .01 *** p < .0001       
 
Collective Efficacy 
 Consistent with prior research, the measure of collective efficacy in the current 
study is identical to the scale as it was originally developed by Sampson et al. (1997) and 
has been used in a variety of follow-up research examining the construct both in the 
United States and internationally (Kirk and Papachristos, 2011; Wickes et al., 2013).  The 
scale can be broken down to the measurement of three basic elements: social control, 
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social cohesion, and trust.  Questions assessing the level of neighborhood social control 
asked respondents to indicate their willingness to intervene in the following scenarios: 1) 
children skipping school, hanging out on street corners, 2) children spray-painting graffiti 
on a local building, 3) children showing disrespect to an adult, (4) fighting in front of 
houses and someone was being beaten or threatened, and 5) budget cuts causing closest 
fire station to be closed down (ICPSR 2766: 10).  To measure social cohesion and trust, 
the following items were combined: 1) people around here are willing to help their 
neighbors, 2) people in this neighborhood can be trusted, (3) people in this neighborhood 
generally get along with each other, (4) this is a close-knit neighborhood, and (5) people 
in this neighborhood share the same values. 
 The scale for collective efficacy was constructed using multilevel models, 
accounting for responses to each question coming from individuals who are nested within 
neighborhoods.  From this, neighborhood-specific empirical Bayes (EB) residuals are 
used as the scale.  In this way, similar to prior research, the collective efficacy scale 
represents the average level of collective efficacy in each neighborhood (Kirk and 
Matsuda, 2011; Sampson et al., 1997). 
Perceived Neighborhood Change 
 The measure of perceived neighborhood change (examining the possibility of 
group threat dynamics) in the current analysis is constructed as a scale, combining 
responses to questions where participants were asked about changes to the neighborhood, 
and whether these changes make the area ‘better,’ ‘worse,’ or ‘the same.’  The following 
items were considered 1) During the past five years has this [neighborhood’s looks] 
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changed for the better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? 2) Have the people living 
in the neighborhood changed for the better, stayed the same, or gotten worse?  3) In the 
next five years, do you think this neighborhood will change for the better, remain the 
same, or get worse?  The perceived neighborhood change scale has reliability 
(Cronbach’s Alpha) of α = .78.  The mean score is .39, with higher numbers indicating a 
higher level of perceived neighborhood change in the neighborhood.  Similar to the 
construction of the collective efficacy measure, to generate a variable measuring the 
average level of perceived neighborhood change in a neighborhood multilevel modeling 
was used to generate neighborhood-specific EB residuals. 
Neighborhood-level Controls 
 Several structural characteristics were included in the analysis, taken from the 
1990 and 2000 Census.  Consistent with prior research, the racial-ethnic composition of 
each neighborhood was measured using dummy variables (DiPietro, 2010; Kirk and 
Matsuda, 2011).  African American NC refers to clusters with a 70 percent or higher 
African American population.  Similar variables were constructed for White NC and 
Latino NC.  For the variable Mixed NC, the clusters were coded “1” if they had less than 
70 percent of one single group.  In this study, the largest proportion of neighborhoods 
were classified as ‘Mixed’ (52 percent), with 22 percent identified as African American, 
16 percent identified as White, and 10 percent identified as Latino.  The concentration of 
poverty of the neighborhood clusters is also examined with a scale assembled from the 
1990 U.S. Census.
21
   
                                                          
21
 This measure includes: percentage of families below poverty line, percent receiving public assistance, 




In the PHDCN Community Survey, the participants are nested within each 
neighborhood cluster, which means that the data include individuals who are clustered 
within similar surroundings and environmental conditions.  Analyses utilizing single-
level modeling strategies are therefore inappropriate because these assume that the 
variance between individuals is constant, and that although individuals are nested within 
similar conditions they differ at random.  It is necessary, therefore, to account for this 
clustering to address any violation of independent error terms across neighborhoods 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).  Because my focus in the current study is how 
neighborhood conditions affect violence and victimization, the focus of my analyses will 
be on the between-neighborhood (level 2) variation.   
 A multilevel research design will allow an examination of neighborhood-level 
characteristics and the contextual effects of violence and victimization.  Hierarchical 
linear modeling (HLM) is appropriate for the current analyses for several reasons.  In 
traditional techniques such as ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a critical 
assumption is independence of error terms.  However, in the current sample it is at least 
probable that individuals nested within the same neighborhood clusters will have similar 
responses.  Therefore, if OLS regression were used in the current study there would be a 
risk of violating the assumption of independent error terms and underestimating standard 
errors (Bryk and Raudenbuch, 1992; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  HLM is also useful 
because it adjusts the degrees of freedom to the number of level-2 units (in this case, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
mirrors scales of concentrated poverty that have been constructed to examine PHDCN neighborhood 
clusters in prior research (Kirk and Matsuda, 2011; Sampson et al., 1997). 
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342 neighborhood clusters as opposed to the 7,739 participants). HLM will allow the 
current project to model individual-level characteristics and neighborhood-level 
characteristics, while taking into account within- and between-neighborhood variation.  
The current project uses HLM 6.0 to conduct all multilevel modeling analyses.  
Hierarchical linear modeling is chosen because both perceived violence and victimization 
risk are continuous variables.  The model follows a normal distribution of the outcome 
variable.   
The general form of the two level linear model is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑋1𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?1) + ⋯ +  𝛽𝑘𝑗(𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?𝑘) + 𝑟𝑖𝑗, where   (1) 
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑊1 + ⋯ + 𝛾0𝑚𝑊𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑗,     (2) 
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝑢1𝑗, and         (3) 
𝛽𝑘𝑗 = 𝛾𝑘0 + 𝑢𝑘𝑗        (4) 
Equation 1 is the level-one model which includes the vector of individual-level 
characteristics.  Grand-mean centering is used given the interest in the current study on 
contextual factors to avoid constraining the neighborhood-level contextual differences 
unnecessarily (Johnson and Ulmer, 2004).  Equations 2 through 4 demonstrate the 
neighborhood-level analyses, where all level 2 predictors are used to predict the level 1 
intercept (𝛽0𝑗).  Error terms are included for both the individual level (𝑟𝑖𝑗) and the 
neighborhood level (𝑢𝑖𝑗). 
When examining perceived violence, each model in the analysis assumes a 
normal distribution of the outcome variable.  The results will be discussed in the 
following chapter, and the analyses will proceed in a series of three steps.  The first step 
shows the descriptive results, highlighting the inter-neighborhood variations.  The second 
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step is a presentation of the unconditional model, which will show there is sufficient 
inter-neighborhood variation to warrant multilevel modeling.  And the third and final step 
is the contextual analysis, examining perceived violence and victimization and the effect 
of neighborhood conditions.  To examine whether the relationship between gentrification 
and crime is moderated by collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood change, 
interaction terms will be included in the final models.   
The following chapter will also discuss the results of the analysis of spatial 
displacement effects.  This section utilizes data from the same sources, and the analytic 















CHAPTER SEVEN  RESULTS: CONTEXTUAL AND DISPLACEMENT 
EFFECTS 
 The following chapter presents the results of the analyses.  First the analyses 
examining the first three research hypotheses pertaining to gentrification’s relationship to 
crime and the possibility of contextual effects of collective efficacy and perceived 
neighborhood change will be presented.  After outlining the descriptive statistics and 
zero-order correlations between neighborhood-level variables, this chapter will examine 
multilevel models aimed at addressing the research hypotheses concerning the link 
between gentrification, crime, and other contextual factors.  This will be followed by an 
examination of the fourth research hypothesis, pertaining to spatial displacement effects.   
 Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for the sample, which provide 
preliminary evidence for inter-neighborhood variation.  The sample is 59 percent female, 
with an average age of 42.7 years.  The same is predominantly African American (40 
percent) and the respondents had spent an average of 10.39 years at their current address 
at the time of the survey.  Approximately 33.4 percent of the respondents had lived in 
their neighborhood for less than five years.  This is significant because it reveals that the 
majority of the respondents to the PHDCN survey were residents who were living in their 
neighborhoods before the measures of gentrification in each neighborhood cluster began.  







Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables, PHDCN Community Survey. 1994-95 
    N  Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent Variable  
    
  
  Perceived Violence 7,739 2.02 0.41 1.2739 3.3104 
 Violent Victimization  7,739 1.67    
Individual-Level Variables (N=7,739) 
    
  
  Female 
 
0.59 0.49 0 1 
  African American 
 
0.40 0.49 0 1 
  White 
 
0.28 0.45 0 1 
  Other 
 
0.08 0.48 0 1 
  Latino 
 
0.25 0.43 0 1 
  Age 
 
42.66 16.72 17 100 
  Socio-economic index 
 
44.26 18.07 17 97 
  Years at Address 
 
10.39 11.97 0 81.5 
Neighborhood-Level Variables (N=342) 
    
  















 Mixed Neighborhood   0.17  0 1 
  Gentrification 
 
0.35 0.29 0.06 1 
  Collective Efficacy 
 
3.54 0.90 1.03 4.99 
  Perceived Neigh. Change   1.94 1.41 0.00 4.96 
 
 The variation in the neighborhood-level variables provides preliminary evidence 
that there is between-neighborhood variation, but this will be evaluated with 
unconditional models to determine whether or not this variation is significant enough to 
warrant multilevel modeling techniques.  For example, while the average score on 
gentrification scale was 0.35, neighborhoods ranged from 0.06 to 1.0.  Similarly, for the 
variables capturing collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood change, there is 
considerable range in the scores across neighborhoods on both of these measures.  There 
is also variability in the composition of these neighborhoods; the majority (55 percent) of 
neighborhoods are predominantly African American, but the remaining neighborhoods 
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are split between white (18 percent), Hispanic (10 percent), and Mixed neighborhoods 
without one predominant racial-ethnic group (17 percent). 
Table 4 shows the zero-order correlations between predictors at the 
neighborhood-level being used in the study.  These results provide valuable preliminary 
evidence for associations between the key variables of interest. 
Table 4. Neighborhood-Level Zero-Order Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.  Perc. Neigh. Change -- 
     2.  African American NC 0.548*** -- 
    3.  Latino NC 0.120 -0.785*** -- 
   4.  Mixed NC 0.489** -0.682** -0.473** -- 
  5.  Collective Efficacy -0.645*** -0.376** -0.175* 0.348* -- 
 
6.  Gentrification 0.621** 0.501** -0.242* 0.627** -0.189* -- 
N = 342  *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
 Results indicate there is a strong negative association between perceived 
neighborhood change and collective efficacy (r = -.645, p < .001).  This suggests that 
neighborhoods with high levels of threat and dissatisfaction with the changes to their 
neighborhood are less likely to engage in collective efficacy – at least as it relates to 
violence and crime.  This finding is consistent with previous research examining the 
effects of social control forces and perceived threat on crime at the neighborhood level 
(King and Wheelock, 2007).  There is also a strong positive association between 
perceived neighborhood change and gentrification (r = .621, p < .01), which indicates that 
in many neighborhoods where gentrification is happening there are feelings of 
dissatisfaction, threat, and resentment towards the changes. 
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 The results also indicate that gentrification is more likely in predominantly 
African American neighborhoods (r = .548, p < .001) or in neighborhoods with no racial-
ethnic group comprising the majority (r = .489, p < .01), but there is no significant 
association between gentrification and Latino neighborhoods (r = .120).  These findings 
complement prior research (Velez, Lyons, and Boursaw, 2012) and archival newspaper 
coverage of the gentrification process as it unfolded in Chicago during the 1990s; several 
newspaper stories discussed the rapid change to traditionally African American areas, and 
noted that the neighborhoods that changed first were those where there was already a 
more racially mixed population (Chase, 1998; Lauerman, 1992; Martin, 1996).  
Neighborhoods that are predominantly Latino (r = -.175, p < .05) or African American (r 
= -.376, P < .01) are less likely to have high collective efficacy scores, but high collective 
efficacy scores are significantly more likely in mixed neighborhoods (.348, p < .05).  
Additionally, there is a modest but significant negative association between collective 
efficacy and gentrification (r = -.189, p < .05).   
Contextual Effects 
 The multilevel models used in the current analyses are built in a series of steps, 
the first being the creation of unconditional models.  The unconditional models of 
perceived violence and of victimization are necessary to show whether or not there is 
significant inter-neighborhood variation in perceived violence and in victimization to 
warrant further multilevel analysis (Luke 2004).  These models have no predictors, and 




Table 5.  Unconditional HLM Models of Perceived Violence and Victimization 
Perceived Violence 




b SE T-Ratio Df P-value 
  Intercept, B0 
     
  
  Intercept, G00 
 
1.862 0.0702 26.507 341 0.000 
Random Effects 
 
Var SD χ-sq. Df P-value 
  Level 2, U0 
 
0.35922 0.59935 2886.1105 341 0.000 
  
      
  
Victimization 




b SE T-Ratio Df P-value 
  Intercept, B0 
     
  
  Intercept, G00 
 
1.574 0.0814 28.365 341 0.000 
Random Effects 
 
Var SD χ-sq. Df P-value 
  Level 2, U0 
     
  
  Level 1, R   0.47811 0.68432 2944.235 341 0.000 
 
 The fact that there is a significant variance component (b = 1.862, p < .001) at 
level two for the outcome indicates that multilevel modeling may be useful in this study 
to identify neighborhood-level variations in perceived violence.  Similarly, the 
unconditional model including victimization also includes a significant variance 
component (b = 1.574, p <.001), which indicates that throughout the city of Chicago 
there is meaningful variation in the level of victimization by neighborhood cluster. 
 To examine the effect of gentrification, collective efficacy, and perceived 
neighborhood change on crime, a series of multilevel models are estimated.  The initial 
model incorporates individual-level predictors, so that the effects of these variables can 
be controlled to examine the contextual (neighborhood-level) effects.  The model is then 
expanded iteratively with the addition of gentrification, concentrated poverty, racial-
ethnic composition variables, collective efficacy, and perceived neighborhood change.  
To examine the possibility of collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood change 
moderating the effect between gentrification and crime, interaction terms are introduced.  
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When adding interaction terms to the model, an increase in the variance that is explained 
(r-squared) and a significant effect of the interaction term will be used to evaluate 
whether moderation has occurred.  If the original predictors are still significant after 
inclusion of the interaction terms, this will suggest that these predictors still have a direct 
effect (Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie, 1981).  In this way, it will be possible to 
determine whether the strength and direction of the relationship between gentrification 
and crime depends on either the level of collective efficacy or the level of perceived 
neighborhood change perceived in the neighborhoods.  If the interaction terms have a 
significant effect, this will confirm the moderation relationship.  If the significance of the 
perceived neighborhood change and collective efficacy variables are reduced and 
insignificant, it will suggest that these variables do not have a direct effect on crime, but 
are meaningful primarily for their interaction with gentrification processes. 
 To check for potential collinearity problems, variance inflation factors (VIF 
scores) were calculated for the level-two predictors.  Statisticians have generally referred 
to VIF scores of 10 as the threshold above which problems of multicollinearity may arise.  
However, more recent scholars have challenged this rule of thumb, arguing that VIF 
scores as high as 40 do not automatically guarantee multicollinearity problems (O’Brien, 
2007).  As shown below, none of the VIF scores exceeded 11; therefore, potential 






Variable VIF Score 
Latino NC 2.83 
Black NC 2.10 
Mixed NC 2.51 
Concentration of poverty 2.03 
Gentrification 8.89 
Collective Efficacy 8.08 
Perc. Neigh. Change 7.75 
Gent x PNC 10.74 
Gent x Collective Efficacy 9.93 
 
 Model 1 in Table 6 reveals that there are significant differences in perceived 
violence and victimization by gender, racial-ethnic group, and by socioeconomic status.  
Similar to prior research (Kirk and Matsuda, 2011; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 
2011), being disadvantaged (b = -.345 p < .05), male (b = -1.879, p <.001), and a member 
of a racial or ethnic minority (b = 1.754, p < .001) is associated with a heightened 
perception of violence and higher risk of victimization.  Living more years at the current 
address was associated with a decreased perception of violence, but this relationship did 
not reach statistical significance (b = -.212).  In addition, the relationship between age 
and perceived violence did not reach statistical significance, but it appears that higher 
levels of perceived violence and higher levels of victimization were reported by younger 
respondents (b = -.312).  These results are supportive of the findings from prior literature 
that violence and victimization rates are higher amongst the young (Farrington, 1986; 





Table 6.  Multilevel Model of Perceived Violence and Victimization  
with Individual-Level Characteristics 
  
 
Model 1 (Perceived Violence) 
 








Intercept 1.024 *** 0.085 
 
-1.878 *** 0.074  
Individual-Level Variables (N=7,739) 
     
  
  Female -1.879 *** 0.165 
 
-1.764 *** 0.105 
  
African 
American 1.754 *** 0.263 
 
1.817 *** 0.274 
  Other -1.035 * 0.294 
 
-1.014 ϯ 0.307 
  Latino 1.075 *** 0.260 
 
1.021 * 0.213 









index -0.345 * 0.104 
 
-0.378 * 0.139 







ϯp < .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001           
 
 Table 7 displays the analyses using perceived violence as the outcome variable.  
In Model 2, which is displayed in Table 7, the primary neighborhood-level variable of 
interest was introduced (gentrification).  For every additional increase in the level of 
gentrification on the scale, the level of neighborhood violence decreases by an average of 
.259, and this effect is statistically significant (b = .259, p < .01).  This result provides an 
important initial examination of the overall relationship between gentrification and 
perceived violence; similar to prior research (O’Sullivan, 2005; Papachristos et al., 2011), 
these data suggest that neighborhoods experiencing gentrification also experience a 
significant decline in perceived violence.  This effect is significant after controlling for 
the racial-ethnic composition of the neighborhood and the level of concentrated poverty 




Table 7.  Hierarchical Linear Models of Perceived Violence 
    Model 2    Model 3 
 
Model 4 
Variables b   (SE)   b   (SE)   b   (SE) 
Intercept 1.014 *** 0.088 
 
1.018 *** 0.090 
 
1.021 *** 0.089 
  
           
  
Individual-Level Variables (N=7,739)  
  Female -1.897 *** 0.142 
 
-1.853 *** 0.138 
 
-1.867 *** 0.211 
  African American 1.698 *** 0.234 
 
1.742 *** 0.337 
 
1.755 *** 0.286 
  Other -1.024 ** 0.317 
 
-0.980 * 0.301 
 
-0.984 * 0.304 
  Latino 1.107 *** 0.249 
 
1.151 *** 0.243 
 
1.162 *** 0.287 













index -0.383 * 0.099 
 
-0.382 * 0.102 
 
-0.401 * 0.098 











Neighborhood-Level Variables (N=342)  









  Black NC 1.568 ** 0.588 
 
1.560 ** 0.426 
 
1.534 ** 0.475 
  Mixed NC 1.372 * 0.476 
 
1.278 * 0.385 
 
1.272 * 0.362 
  
Concentration of 









  Gentrification -0.259 ** 0.342 
 
















  Per Neigh Change 
    
0.530 ** 0.217 
 
0.186 ϯ 0.223 
  Gent x PNC 
        
0.374 * 0.314 
  
Gent x Collective 
Efficacy 
        





   
0.40 
   
0.52 
ϯp < .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; 
***p ≤ .001                     
 
 Model 3 in Table 7 introduces both the collective efficacy and perceived 
neighborhood change factors at the neighborhood level.  In this model, the negative 
correlation between gentrification and perceived violence remains significant, but the 
effect size has been reduced (b = -.197, p <.01).  Perceived neighborhood change has a 
positive and significant association with perceived violence (b = .530, p < .01), 
suggesting that the level of violence in a neighborhood increases by .530 for every 
increase in the level of perceived neighborhood change.  While few studies have 
examined perceived neighborhood change from the specific context of threat as a 
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response to gentrification, this result is consistent with prior research findings that areas 
with high levels of perceived neighborhood change from outside groups tend to have 
higher rates of crime (King and Wheelock, 2007; Levine and Campbell, 1972).  The 
relationship between a neighborhood’s average level of collective efficacy and perceived 
violence is not significant (b = .075).  Prior research has generally found that collective 
efficacy is negatively associated with crime (Pratt and Cullen, 2005).  However, these 
findings do complement recent research findings which indicate that the effect of 
collective efficacy on crime is not significant once other neighborhood-level contextual 
factors are included (Kirk and Matsuda, 2011). 
 Interaction terms are introduced in Model 4 of Table 7 to examine the interaction 
between the key variables of interest with gentrification.  Perceived neighborhood change 
and collective efficacy were each examined for potential interaction effects with 
gentrification.  Both moderators were included in the model to examine whether or not 
any direct effects remained after inclusion of the interaction terms.  Model 4 suggests that 
the interaction between gentrification and perceived neighborhood change results in a 
positive and significant association with violence (b = .374, P <.05).  Results reveal that 
the relationship between gentrification and perceived violence varies depending on the 
level of perceived neighborhood change in neighborhoods.  An interaction between 
gentrification and increasing perceived neighborhood change is associated with a 
significant increase in levels of violence.  The interaction term included to examine 
whether there is an interaction between gentrification and collective efficacy suggests a 
significant negative association (b = -1.425, p <.01).  It appears from this result that 
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collective efficacy in gentrifying neighborhoods may strengthen the negative association 
with violence.   
The fact that the interaction terms suggest a different association between the 
factors and perceived violence seems to complement data from the Table 4 correlation 
matrix; it appears that there is not much overlap between neighborhoods high in 
collective efficacy and high in perceived neighborhood change (b = -.645, p < .001), so 
the fact that these contextual factors produce different effects with gentrification on 
perceived violence indicates that the way in which gentrification impacts perceived 
violence is highly dependent on neighborhood contextual factors.  It is informative that 
these divergent contextual factors have varying effects on areas experiencing 
gentrification.  Collective efficacy appears to work as a protective factor, whereas when 
gentrification is accompanied by high levels of perceived neighborhood change, this 
increases a neighborhood’s level of violence. 
In Chapter Five, it was suggested that perceived neighborhood change may 
increase when a gentrifying neighborhood experiences a significant shift in the racial or 
ethnic profile of the area.  Supplementary analysis offers support for this by examining 
levels of perceived neighborhood change in neighborhoods whose racial-ethnic 
composition saw a change from the beginning to the end of the decade.  To examine this, 
the neighborhoods scoring in the 75
th
 percentile or higher on the gentrification scale were 
included, which resulted in 87 clusters for analyses scoring from 0.58 to 1.0 on the scale.  
Out of all 87 neighborhoods, 61 percent were neighborhoods that were predominantly 
African American in 1990 (≥ 70%).  Ten percent were neighborhoods that were 
predominantly white, and 6 percent were predominantly Latino neighborhoods.  If 
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perceived neighborhood change is indeed a factor that is driven by racial-ethnic 
characteristics, we would expect higher levels of perceived neighborhood change in 
neighborhoods that saw a dramatic compositional change from 1990 to 2000.  Figure 5 
presents data which support this claim, showing variation in perceived neighborhood 
change by change in the racial-ethnic profile of the population.   
 
For gentrifying neighborhoods that began the decade predominantly African 
American, those with a decline in the proportion of African Americans had significantly 
higher perceived neighborhood change scores than those where the neighborhood 
remained predominantly African American; a one-tailed t-test at alpha .05 yielded a p-
value of .032.  For gentrifying neighborhoods that began the decade predominantly 
Latino, those which were no longer predominantly Latino by the end of the decade had 
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higher perceived neighborhood change scores than those which remained predominantly 
Latino, but this difference was only marginally significant (p-value .091).  For 
gentrifying white neighborhoods, those remaining predominantly white were not 
significantly different than those whose racial profile changed in their level of perceived 
neighborhood change (p-value .621).   
Examining the results using victimization as the outcome variable, similar 
patterns emerge.  Similar to the analyses above, Table 8 reveals that the significance of 
gentrification goes away once the interaction terms are included in the model.  While 
gentrification initially had a significantly negative association with victimization, this 
effect diminishes and is no longer significant once the moderation variables are included.  
When gentrification interacts with collective efficacy, this has a significant and negative 
effect on victimization; this strengthens the conclusions drawn from analyses with 
perceived violence, in both cases, it seems that gentrifying neighborhoods with higher 
levels of collective efficacy have lower levels of victimization.  Additionally, 
gentrification and perceived neighborhood change interact and are significantly 
associated with increases in victimization.  Therefore, similar to prior results, gentrifying 
neighborhoods with higher levels of perceived neighborhood change have a higher risk of 
victimization.  Since perceived violence and victimization are measuring a wide range of 
perceived violence and victimization, it is notable that the interaction variables have 





Table 8.  Hierarchical Linear Models of Victimization 
    Model 2    Model 3   Model 4 
Variables b   (SE)   b   (SE)   b   (SE) 
Intercept -1.895 *** 0.048 
 
-1.887 *** 0.081 
 
-1.898 *** 0.092 
  
           
  
Individual-Level Variables (N=7,739) 
        
  
  Female -1.657 *** 0.134 
 
-1.613 *** 0.141 
 
-1.641 *** 0.207 
  African American 1.588 *** 0.223 
 
1.632 *** 0.322 
 
1.659 *** 0.302 
  Other -1.011 ** 0.407 
 
-0.967 * 0.247 
 
-0.986 * 0.311 
  Latino 1.205 *** 0.202 
 
1.249 *** 0.289 
 
1.244 *** 0.284 











  SES index -0.452 * 0.107 
 
-0.451 * 0.121 
 
-0.433 * 0.097 











Neighborhood-Level Variables (N=342) 
        
  









  Black NC 1.687 ** 0.543 
 
1.521 ** 0.432 
 
1.520 ** 0.402 
  Mixed NC 1.443 * 0.438 
 
1.275 * 0.375 
 
1.264 * 0.346 
  
Concentration of 









  Gentrification -0.275 ** 0.311 
 





  Collective Efficacy 











    
0.602 ** 0.211 
 
0.163 ϯ 0.261 
  Gentrification x PNC 
       
0.373 * 0.319 
  Gentrification x CE 
       
-1.565 ** 0.395 
ϯp < .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001          
 
These results offer partial support for the idea that perceived neighborhood 
change is higher when gentrification causes the racial-ethnic composition of a 
neighborhood to significantly change.  For gentrifying neighborhoods that began 
predominantly composed of racial-ethnic minorities, changes to this composition were 
associated with higher levels of perceived neighborhood change.  Given that the 
perceived neighborhood change measure specifically focuses on feelings related to 
population change, it is reasonable to assume that threat and changing racial-ethnic 
dynamics are linked.  These findings are validated with both outcome measures, and 
103 
 
complement prior research which has found that group threat is closely linked to changes 
in the racial-ethnic composition, however the majority of prior research has examined 
this from the perspective of predominantly white neighborhoods with an increasing 
presence of racial-ethnic minorities (Bobo, 1988; Green et al., 1998).  This study presents 
the novel finding that these dynamics are similar when other racial-ethnic groups are the 
majority in an area.  The limitations and policy implications of these findings will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight.  
 
Conclusions – Revisiting First Three Research Hypotheses 
Hypothesis one in Chapter Six suggested that there would be an overall negative 
association between gentrification and perceived violence.  Results from the multilevel 
modeling analyses provide partial support for that hypothesis.  Prior to examining any 
moderating effects, results suggest that gentrifying neighborhoods experience less overall 
violence and victimization.  However, the direct effect of gentrification on perceived 
violence is no longer significant once the interaction terms are included.  Hypotheses two 
and three each predicted that gentrification would interact with collective efficacy and 
perceived neighborhood change at the neighborhood level and result in varying 
associations with perceived violence.  Results from the multilevel modeling analyses 
suggest support for these hypotheses.  Gentrification and perceived neighborhood change 
did interact and result in a positive association with violence; this suggests that when 
neighborhoods are experiencing gentrification but are dissatisfied and threatened by the 
changes to their neighborhood, this is associated with an increase in neighborhood 
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violence.  There was also a significant negative association between collective efficacy 
and gentrification on violence, suggesting that in cohesive neighborhoods who exercise 
trust and social control, gentrification results in a decrease in neighborhood violence.  
The limitations and implications of these results are discussed in detail in chapter nine. 
Analyses of Displacement Effects 
 Prior research on gentrification and crime has suggested that displacement of 
criminal activity is one potential outcome of this form of neighborhood change, although 
authors have noted that the accurate measurement of displacement effects have yet to be 
undertaken (Kirk and Laub, 2010).  There are several methodological challenges between 
attempting an analysis of crime displacement due to a program or process.  Formally 
defined, displacement refers to “the relocation of crime from one place, time, target, 
offense, or tactic to another” as a result of some initiative (Guerette, 2009:1).  When 
discussed in the context of the implementation of intervention strategies, displacement 
has been characterized as an unintended negative consequence of efforts to reduce crime 
(Eck, 1993; Guerette and Bowers, 2009).  In the current study, spatial displacement is 
being examined to determine whether or not offenders seem to switch from targets in 
gentrification areas to targets in adjacent neighborhoods that are not experiencing 
gentrification. 
The logic behind predicting a spatial displacement effect has been addressed 
within opportunity theory and environmental criminology.  While classic work in 
criminology has assumed that opportunities to commit crime are ubiquitous, and 
offenders are uneasily deterred (Sutherland, 1947), environmental criminological theory 
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has introduced compelling arguments to challenge these assumptions.  Several scholars 
have noted that crime is not evenly distributed throughout areas, but is instead clustered 
into particular locations (Bursik and Webb, 1982; Weisburd et al., 1992; Wortley and 
Mazerolle, 2013).  In his work developing situational crime prevention theory, Clarke 
and his colleagues have argued that most traditional criminology theories have a 
dispositional bias; by focusing so intently on the root causes of criminal behavior, they 
have neglected to account for the environmental and situational conditions within which 
crime tends to arise (Clarke, 1980, 1997; Clark and Mayhew, 1980).  The issue of 
displacement due to change in opportunities has been examined by environmental 
criminologists, and the results generally fail to find displacement effects.  Clark and 
Mayhew (1988) examined the detoxification of domestic gas in homes and the rate of 
suicides in England and Wales.  In this study, they observed that when the opportunity to 
commit suicide using gas in the home (i.e. in an oven) was reduced due to a change in the 
composition of domestic gas, the result was an overall reduction in the suicide rate, and 
not an increase in suicide using other methods (Clarke and Mayhew, 1988).   
Several scholars have followed this research, and found evidence against crime 
displacement by type (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994; Cornish and Clarke, 1987).  
Additionally, Weisburd and colleagues (2006) have shown that when hot spots policing 
initiatives are implemented at particular intersections, crime does not seem to spatially 
displace, but rather the benefits of the increased police presence are enjoyed in the 
surrounding blocks.  It remains unknown, however, whether neighborhood-level 
processes that are more gradual and over larger areas can cause any spatial displacement 
effects. If gentrification makes crime less possible or more risky in one neighborhood, 
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criminal activity may not decline but simply relocate to a nearby neighborhood with 
conditions and opportunities similar to the original neighborhood prior to changes. 
In the current study, Hypothesis Four predicts that there will be evidence of a 
spatial displacement effect from the gentrifying neighborhoods into adjacent areas.  Both 
environmental criminological theory and prior research suggest that spatial displacement 
does not take place, and this serves as the basis for the current prediction.  In the current 
study, having an awareness of the physical location of each area undergoing 
gentrification makes it possible to conduct an exploratory investigation into the 
possibility of a spatial displacement effect.  The prior chapter demonstrated that overall 
there is a negative relationship between gentrification and perceived violence, although 
this effect is moderated by other neighborhood-level forces.  In the current chapter, 
comparisons will be drawn between gentrifying areas and those adjacent to them, to 
ascertain whether or not any evidence of spatial displacement can be identified.   
In the prior chapter, gentrification was measured as a continuous variable.  
However, in the current chapter only those neighborhoods scoring in the 90
th
 percentile 
or higher on this scale will be discussed.
22
 A binary variable was created for 
identification, resulting in 34 clusters out of the original 342.  For the purposes of the 
current analysis, these are the ‘gentrification’ areas.  If these gentrification areas are 
thought of as ‘treatment’ areas, the neighborhoods directly surrounding them can be 
considered the ‘control’ areas.  There is some natural clustering of gentrification 
neighborhoods in the city; out of these 34 clusters, all but two of them are adjacent to 
                                                          
22
 The gentrification scale ranged from 0 – 1, and neighborhoods in the 90
th
 percentile scored 
approximately 0.75 or higher.  The logic behind restricting the current analysis to only those in the 90
th
 
percentile was to capture neighborhoods that had the most potential for rapid change from 1990 to 1995. 
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another gentrification cluster.  When this occurred in the analysis, the control area 
excluded the adjacent gentrification cluster.  The logic behind this decision is based on 
the general assumptions of spatial displacement effects.  It is assumed that if 
gentrification causes the displacement of perceived violence to adjacent areas, this 
perceived violence will be displaced to areas with conditions reminiscent of the original 
area prior to gentrification, not adjacent areas undergoing similar changes.  Going back to 
the theoretical framework from environmental criminology, perceived violence would be 
expected to move to an area where the opportunities and situational contexts are similar 
to the previous conditions (Clarke, 1997).  For these reasons, the control areas only 
contain adjacent clusters without significant gentrification.  To calculate rates and 
averages across each control area, their results were weighted by the population in each 
cluster to create measures of the outcomes across the entire control area. 
Figure 6 offers a visual depiction of treatment and control areas.  In this figure, 
gentrifying neighborhood cluster 1 is the dark central cluster (the ‘Treatment Area’).  On 
the gentrification scale (with scores ranging from 0 to 1) this cluster’s value was 0.98 
indicating a high level of gentrification.  The control area contains the neighborhood 
clusters directly adjacent to this cluster (clusters 4 through 8), and in this figure they are 
shaded grey.  On the gentrification scale, their average score was 0.38 (range 0.34 to 
0.41).  There are two adjacent clusters (clusters 2 and 3) that are identified as treatment 
clusters; they are shaded in white and are not included in the calculation of the control 





For each of the 34 neighborhood clusters with high gentrification, two different 
outcome variables are examined: the logged homicide rates from 1990 and 1995, and the 
measure of perceived violence in neighborhoods in the 1994-95 and 2001-02 Community 
Surveys.
23
  Both of these outcome measures have their limitations, which will be 
discussed within the analysis, leaving this examination of spatial displacement effects 
exploratory.  If similar results are achieved with both measurements, this could 
strengthen confidence in their results.  In the future, however, it will be beneficial to 
examine displacement effects with other outcome variables that have higher reliability. 
If the spatial displacement of crime is in fact due to a change in the opportunity 
structures in an area, but adjacent areas have comparable opportunity structures, it is 
                                                          
23
 The logged homicide rate is used to improve the fit of the model; homicide rates are not normally 
distributed (Osgood 2000). 
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possible that prospective offenders will take advantage of these nearby opportunities that 
are comparable to those in the original area.  In other words, crime may displace because 
the opportunities available in adjacent areas are viewed as more appealing than the 
opportunities available in the gentrifying location.  For each treatment area, the areas 
designated as control areas shared some similar initial characteristics, but without the 
promise of gentrification; they were disadvantaged areas but did not possess some of the 
appealing elements which made their adjacent neighbors primed for gentrification.  In the 
clusters shown above in Figure 6, for example, clusters 4 through 8 had low housing 
values, low median incomes, and low numbers of eligible residents with advanced 
degrees.  They did not, however, have good L train access, appealing large housing units 
for conversion, or a large presence of historic architecture. 
 
Analytic Strategy 
 To assess the possibility of displacement effects, difference-in-differences 
estimation is utilized.  This technique captures the difference in outcomes across a time 
span for treatment and control groups, and then compares those differences (Ashenfelter 
and Card, 1985; Heckman et al., 1997).  The construction of the difference-in-differences 
estimation is shown in Table 9 
Table 9. Estimation of Difference-in-Differences 
 1990 1995  Difference 
Treatment Yt1 Yt2 ∆Yt = Yt2 – Yt1  
Control Yc1 Yc2 ∆Yc = Yc2 – Yc1 
Difference   
(?̂?𝟏) 
∆∆Y = ∆Yt – Yc 
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 In the current analysis, values of ?̂?𝟏 that are closer to zero suggest that there is 
little difference between the changes in logged homicide rates for the treatment and 
control areas.  Positive values will indicate that there was a larger change in the control 
areas, and negative values will indicate that there was a larger change in the treatment 
areas.  The results of this estimation for all 34 high gentrification (treatment) areas are 
displayed in Appendix B.  The percentage change is also displayed for the treatment and 
control areas; for example, in treatment cluster 1 the logged homicide rate decreased by 
75.8 percent, and in control area 1 homicide decreased by 35 percent.  The means used in 
the difference-in-differences estimation are shown below in Table 10. 
Table 10. Estimation of Difference-in-Differences Calculations 
 1990 1995  Difference 
Treatment 
Mean logged homicide rate 
3.2946 0.5388 -2.7558  
Control 
Mean logged homicide rate 
3.3832 0.3668 -3.0164 




The difference-in-differences (?̂?𝟏) value is 0.2606.  This number is positive, which 
suggests that the change in homicide rates was slightly larger in the control areas, but it is 
fairly close to zero.   To determine if there was significant difference in the declines in 
the treatment group compared to the control group, a one tailed t-test was used at alpha 
0.05.  With a p-value of 0.162, it is impossible to reject the null hypothesis; the changes 
in logged homicide rates between the treatment and control groups are not significant.   
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 These results are contrary to the predictions of Hypothesis Four; it does not seem 
that gentrification causes a significant spatial displacement effect because the changes 
between areas gentrifying and those around them are similar.  Exclusively utilizing 
homicide rates, however, is not a sufficient way to determine displacement effects.  As a 
rare event, the rates in each neighborhood are extremely small, and changes in the 
homicide rate may be due to a variety of causes.  Scholars have also found that gang-
related homicides spread in an “epidemic-like process of social contagion” (Papachristos, 
2009: 74) and so assuming that events can simply be spatially displaced may not be 
relevant or appropriate. Therefore, using similar methodology, alternative measurements 
of perceived violence are examined in the following section to further investigate the 
possibility of displacement effects. 
To supplement these results, the level of perceived violence in the 2001-02 
Community Survey was compared to the level in the 1994-95 survey for these 34 
neighborhoods and their control areas.  As stated in Chapter Seven, the 2001-02 data 
lacked the sample size and reliability to be used in the contextual analyses of Chapter 
Seven; there were several neighborhoods where the sample size was extremely low.  
However, because this outcome measure is a continuous scale measuring average level of 
perceived violence, it does offer more between-neighborhood variation. Therefore, it will 
be noteworthy if the results are comparable to those found with the logged homicide 
rates.  Because the control and treatment areas were created using information from the 
1990 Census and CTA data, this analysis allows for an examination of whether violence 




Table 11. Estimation of Difference-in-Differences, PHDCN Perceived Violence 
Measure 
 1994-95 2001-02  Difference 
Treatment 
Mean Perceived Violence 
2.0899 2.0775 -0.0124  
Control 
Mean Perceived Violence 
2.0554 1.9422 -0.1132 




The result of this difference-in-differences estimation is displayed in Table 11.  A 
t-test with alpha 0.05 reveals that these differences are not significant with a p-value of 
0.275.  Once again, this supports the idea that spatial displacement effects are not 
observed.  Whether measuring changes in perceived violence or homicide, there is no 
evidence that the gentrification process leads to a displacement of perceived violence to 
nearby areas.  One potential explanation as to why no evidence of spatial displacement is 
observed, could be the fact that some of these adjacent areas may have characteristics of 
what are known as ‘buffer neighborhoods,’ or neighborhoods that are located between 
affluent areas and areas experiencing gentrification (Duncan et al., 2013).  These so-
called buffer neighborhoods may not have appealing opportunity structures, and therefore 
would not be appealing neighborhoods for crime to emerge as a result of displacement.   
 
Conclusions – Revisiting Fourth Research Hypothesis 
 The fourth research hypothesis for this project predicted that there would be 
evidence of a displacement effect between gentrifying areas and adjacent areas not 
experiencing these changes.  This chapter has found results which do not support this 
hypothesis; measuring changes throughout the decade it seems that perceived violence 
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did not displace from gentrifying to adjacent areas.  While these results may be 
considered complementary to the larger body of criminology research that has rejected 
displacement hypotheses, there are several important limitations to the current analysis 
which make these results preliminary.  First, both outcome variables have limitations 
which may cause the outcomes to be extremely sensitive to changes in the data.  The 
logged homicide rate examines an extremely rare form of violent crime, observing that a 
homicide rate had a statistically significant change may not be indicative of a meaningful 
change.  We also have evidence that homicides are often retaliatory in nature, where one 
individual is killed and then another individual is killed in a nearby area as a form of 
revenge (Kirk and Papachristos, 2011).  This makes it possible that the homicide rates are 
not independent between neighborhood clusters.  Second, the data measuring perceived 
violence in the 2001-02 Community Survey are limited by an extremely small sample 
size.  While there were approximately 3,000 participants throughout the city, in some 
neighborhood clusters there are less than 10 participants.  This compromises the 
reliability of these data, and makes drawing comparisons between measures collected in 
the 1994-95 survey and 2001-02 extremely limited. 
 The fact that both methods of examining a displacement effect yielded similar 
results is encouraging for the hypothesis that displacement does not occur.  Additionally, 
the current project has outlined a measurement technique to capture displacement effects 
of perceived violence across neighborhoods which may be valuable for future projects 
attempting to examine the spatial displacement of perceived violence during 
gentrification.  However, the limitations affecting the current conclusions make 
generalizations from these results impossible.  Much more research is needed if we wish 
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CHAPTER EIGHT   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 As the twenty-first century progresses, the urban landscape continues to rapidly 
change.  In the early 20
th
 century human ecologists crafted an understanding of urban 
development and change which no longer characterizes the modern metropolis.  It can no 
longer be assumed that there is a consistent outward migration from urban centers for 
improved living conditions (Park, 1936; Park and Burgess, 1925).  Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon all scholars with an interest in the importance of neighborhood-level 
forces to examine how modern changes to neighborhood conditions impact crime.  
Gentrification continues to enter into the public discourse throughout the country.  It is 
doubtful that gentrification will cease, and the tensions surrounding this process remain 
high.  While many neighborhoods in Chicago experienced gentrification in the 1990s, the 
process continues, and elicits powerful reactions from the residents experiencing the 
changes.  In January of 2015, for example, anonymous protestors taped up signs (shown 
in the picture below) in front of a few coffee shops in the Chicago neighborhood of Pilsen 
to protest gentrification efforts that are changing the area.   
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As this process continues to be debated in the public discourse, is incumbent upon 
the field of criminology to continue to examine gentrification and how it interacts with 
neighborhood factors and crime.  As gentrification remains an extremely polarizing topic, 
many are continuously asking the basic question, “Will gentrification make 
neighborhoods better?”  The answer to this question may help to develop policies and 
strategies that can be put into place as such neighborhood transformations occur. 
This dissertation has examined the relationships between gentrification, 
neighborhood contextual factors, and perceived violence, and has offered an explanation 
for the interaction of these factors, rooted in the traditions of criminological theory about 
informal social control and perceived neighborhood change.  Prior research has 
established an association between gentrification and crime, and in the current study I 
attempted to propose mechanisms which may explain this relationship.  I also offer a 
preliminary exploration of spatial displacement effects which may result from 
gentrification.  The results provide evidence for a nuanced picture of the relationship 
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between gentrification, neighborhood forces, and perceived violence.  Not unlike many 
conclusions in social science, when addressing the question of whether or not 
gentrification makes perceived violence better, the answer is, predictably, “Well, it 
depends.” 
Research Findings 
 There were two primary goals in constructing the first three hypotheses in this 
study.  First, I hoped to provide complementary evidence for the overall negative 
association between gentrification and crime which has been established in the most 
recent research on the phenomenon (Papachristos et al., 2011; Velez, Lyons, and 
Boursaw, 2012).  Second, I hoped to uncover neighborhood contextual factors which 
might moderate the overall relationship between gentrification and perceived violence; it 
has been suggested in prior research that such variation may exist, but this has received 
little empirical attention (Kirk and Laub, 2010).  Support for my first three research 
hypotheses suggests a few conclusions.  First, when all neighborhoods experiencing 
gentrification are examined together they do seem to have lower levels of violence and 
victimization.  This result is consistent with prior research (O’Sullivan, 2005; 
Papachristos et al., 2011; Velez, Lyons, and Boursaw, 2012), and seems to suggest that, 
in the aggregate, neighborhoods that experience gentrification will experience less 
perceived violence. 
 However, the current study extends prior research by examining ways in which 
this effect might vary by neighborhood context.  With the finding that collective efficacy 
moderates the gentrification and perceived violence relationship by strengthening the 
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negative association, it is suggested that a more cohesive, trusting neighborhood might 
have an even stronger crime-reduction benefit as gentrification unfolds.  The current 
study supports this idea; collective efficacy seems to strengthen the crime-reduction 
benefit of gentrification on perceived violence.  There are several potential reasons why 
this may be the case.  Collective efficacy has sometimes been described as a dynamic 
factor that is partly endogenous, or contingent upon the challenges at hand (Morenoff et 
al., 2001; Sampson, 2012).  When posed with the challenges that accompany 
neighborhood turnover and change, perhaps neighborhoods high in collective efficacy do 
better because they take collective action to welcome new residents and new businesses 
into the area.  They may go to meet their new neighbors and invite them to community 
meetings and events, instead of ignoring them and excluding them from local 
organizations. And earlier in the process, they may make efforts to partner with 
developers to become attached and invested in the outcome of the process. 
Edison Park, a northwest Chicago neighborhood, provides anecdotal evidence for 
the power of collective efficacy in action during gentrification efforts.  In this 
neighborhood, the residents took an active role in the process of redevelopment.  
Newspaper articles from the time suggest that while residents enjoyed most of the 
changes, they took action to address certain elements they did not support: 
“Recently, a community group, worried that the streets might become more 
clogged with parked cars and related problems if new bars and restaurants 
move in, asked the city to prohibit any additional liquor licenses from being 
issued in the "Town Center" area along Northwest Highway.  The proposed 
ban has attracted few critics and is supported by Edison Park's Chicago City 
Council representative, Ald. Brian Doherty (41st).” (Chase, 1998: 1) 
 





 District), a 46-year resident of the neighborhood had a similar positive experience 
with the gentrification process because of residents being proactive to participate in the 
changes: 
“We`re meeting our goal, which, from my point of view, is a change from the 
absentee landlords we suffered through in the late `60s and `70s. Owner-
occupied property is a majority now, though I can`t give you a number, and 
brings back stability. People who own their property are more aggressive 
about what they want in terms of city services, whereas absentee landlords 
only care about the rent.” (Lauerman, 1992: 2) 
A neighborhood without the ability to take action and intervene to tackle such 
issues in this manner might grow upset over time if the changes to their area were 
upsetting their ability to use public space.  The current study supports the idea that 
gentrification, coupled with collective efficacy, can help to improve neighborhood 
perceived violence.  By taking action and addressing problems, perhaps gentrifying 
neighborhoods with collective efficacy enjoy lower violence and victimization because 
they stop problems from developing into criminogenic situations.  This result is also 
complementary to prior work on collective efficacy.  Scholars have often noted that this 
neighborhood quality can play a powerful role in solving problems and reducing crime 
(Mazerolle, Wickes, and McBroom, 2010; Morenoff et al., 2001; Sampson et al., 1997; 
Wickes, 2010).  In the current project, the results complement prior research by 
demonstrating that collective efficacy can specifically help reduce perceived violence in 
gentrifying neighborhoods. 
Another conclusion to be drawn from this study is that neighborhoods perceiving 
the changes to their community as threatening may experience rises in perceived 
violence.  Prior research supports these conclusions, although most prior research 
assumes that the group being threatened is middle-class white residents (Eitle and Taylor, 
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2008; Hipp, 2007; King, 2007).  In part, the results in the current study may be due to 
violent clashes between new and longtime residents, and it may manifest itself through 
property crimes designed to target newly redeveloped spaces and residences.  It could 
also be the case that new residents instigate confrontations regarding the use of public 
space, appearance of residences, and power over resources.  Results in the current study 
found similar positive associations between gentrification and perceived neighborhood 
change for violence and overall victimization.
24
  The sense of threat in these changing 
Chicago neighborhoods is perhaps best personified with this quote from Erskine Sankey, 
a longtime resident of the northeast neighborhood Uptown along Chicago’s border with 
Lake Michigan.  Sankey was interviewed about the rising tensions in the area: 
"My main reason for [protesting] is the woman who has two children and 
makes $300 a month on public aid isn't welcome here, but the guy who makes 
$100,000 a year is." (Martin, 1996: 1). 
The supplementary analyses examining variation in perceived neighborhood 
change by change in the racial-ethnic composition of gentrifying neighborhoods also 
supports the importance of group threat dynamics.  Results suggest that gentrifying 
neighborhoods that began the process predominantly composed of one racial-ethnic 
minority scored much higher on the perceived neighborhood change measure if they lost 
predominance in the neighborhood.  In this way, the study supports the idea that racial 
and ethnic dynamics remains an important way in which neighborhoods establish their 
identity; the threatening of this racial-ethnic identity seems to be a driving force behind 
perceptions of perceived neighborhood change.  Prior research in group threat dynamics 
offers confirmation that race-ethnicity often plays an important role in establishing group 
                                                          
24
 Refer to Appendix C for analyses examining victimization as the outcome measure. 
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dynamics (Kane, 2003; King and Wheelock, 2007), and the current study reinforces these 
findings.   
One slightly divergent finding, however came when examining predominantly 
white neighborhoods.  Interestingly, when a predominantly white neighborhood lost this 
identity during gentrification, their measure of perceived neighborhood change was not 
significantly different from predominantly white neighborhoods who maintained this 
identity.  In part, this may be due to small sample size; only five white neighborhoods 
lost their predominance as a result of gentrification, and for those who did the change in 
population may not have been enough to trigger perceptions of threat.  Group threat 
research has discussed the idea of a ‘tipping point’ where members of the majority 
perceive a change in the minority presence (Blau, 1977; Horowitz, 1985); perhaps in 
these neighborhoods the change in population was not enough to trigger this perception. 
In the group threat literature, competition for resources is commonly cited as the 
impetus for violence and crime (Bobo et al., 1986; Clark, 1991; Frey, 1979).  The current 
study demonstrates that this may be true in circumstance other than the traditionally 
examined scenario of white middle- and upper-class residents perceiving rises in the 
number of racial-ethnic minorities in the area.  The results of this study seem to 
strengthen the reliability of the group threat model; across racial and social context and 
situation, what is supported in this study is the notion that neighborhoods where change is 




In summary, this study both complements and extends prior research examining 
the relationship between gentrification and perceived violence within neighborhoods.  
Several of the most recent studies have found a negative relationship between 
gentrification and subsequent crime (Kreager et al., 2011; Papachristos et al., 2011; 
Velez, Lyons, and Boursaw, 2012) and in the examination of the overall effect in 
Chicago the current study comes to a similar conclusion.  However, this study also 
extends prior research by examining potential mechanisms which either strengthen or 
weaken this relationship, and the results suggest that the context within which 
gentrification emerges plays a large role in its effect.   
The fourth hypothesis in this study addressed the possibility of spatial perceived 
violence displacement, and while results contradicted the prediction that crime is not 
displaced by gentrification, limited conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of spatial 
displacement effects.  The differences between levels of violence and victimization in 
these neighborhoods were not significant; on its surface this suggests that displacement is 
not taking place.  There are a few potential explanations as to why the changes are not 
significantly different.  Perhaps the adjacent areas were being impacted by the changes to 
the gentrifying neighborhoods even though they themselves were not undergoing 
gentrification.  When considering the logistics of the hypothetical spatial displacement of 
perceived violence due to gentrification, perhaps these findings make sense.  It would 
take considerable motivation and initiative to relocate all of one’s activities to another 
neighborhood.  We have evidence from research on hot spots policing initiatives that 
crime does not seem to displace from one intersection to nearby blocks as the result of a 
short-term initiative (Weisburd et al., 2006), so the fact that perceived violence does not 
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displace as a result of the much longer and broader process of gentrification across 
neighborhoods makes intuitive sense.  However, these conclusions can only be called 
preliminary; better measurement of perceived violence and crime at smaller intervals of 
time and between smaller spatial units is necessary in the future to examine the 
possibility of a spatial displacement effect on crime as the result of gentrification. 
Study Limitations 
 The limitations of this study and how these limitations impact the findings are 
critical to consider when interpreting the results.  First, the outcome measures in this 
study were gathered at one point; this made it impossible to assess the change in these 
outcomes over the entire span of the decade within which the gentrification processes 
took place.  Therefore, while gentrification may have happened over the entire decade, 
we are only able to measure perceived violence and the neighborhood contextual factors 
at the midpoint of the decade.  Therefore, our measurements of violence and 
victimization may be underestimated, and the measures of perceived neighborhood 
change and collective efficacy may have also changed by the end of the time frame.  This 
will be important to examine in future research when more reliable data is collected 
across time.  Second, the current study is limited by its measurement of gentrification in 
neighborhood clusters.  While these groupings of census tracts are excellent for tapping 
into neighborhood-level mechanisms, they do not allow for a narrower examination of 
neighborhood change.  Research on gentrification has noted that it does not always occur 
evenly across areas (Wyley and Hammel, 1999), but the current study was not able to 
examine variations in how gentrification impacted smaller portions of the neighborhoods.  
Much discussion has been given in recent research to the importance of basing the level 
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of aggregation in research on theoretically sound arguments (Hipp, 2007; Weisburd et al., 
2004).  The current study seeks to place the examination of gentrification and perceived 
violence within the framework of neighborhood social control, therefore the choice of 
neighborhood clusters complements the body of literature building in this area.  However, 
it remains a limitation of the current study that it is unable to go within these clusters to 
measure variation in the impact of gentrification processes on perceived violence. 
 Third, a limitation which must be addressed is the fact that the processes being 
discussed in this research are likely occurring simultaneously; this makes definitive 
causal statements about the suggested pathways in the current research difficult because 
they are likely to all have some impact on each other.  For this reason, the causal 
explanations throughout the study have been referred to as suggested relationships; future 
research will aid in our understanding of the causal pathways with evidence gathered 
from longitudinal data over time.  Gentrification may reduce perceived violence, but it 
remains unexplored in the current project whether this reduction in perceived violence 
had any effect on subsequent gentrification processes.  Similarly, the mechanisms of 
collective efficacy and perceived neighborhood change are examined for their effect on 
gentrification, but it is likely that these forces also impact each other over time.  The 
current project utilized data that only measured these elements at one point in time, which 
made it impossible to examine the reciprocal nature of how all of these simultaneously 
working mechanisms impact each other.  Future research in this area will benefit from 




 Fourth, the outcome measures capturing violence and victimization are unofficial 
measures; they capture the perceptions of the residents and not official police reports of 
crime incidents.  These data may give us a more accurate understanding of the level of 
violence and crime; scholars have long noted that police reports are underestimates of 
criminal incidents (Catalano, 2006; Lynch and Addington, 2006).  However, as they are 
measures of residents’ perceptions, they cannot be verified further.  Additionally, 
research has also demonstrated that perception of violence and crime play a powerful role 
in neighborhood cohesion, activities in the area, and general satisfaction (Hartnagel, 
1979; Sampson et al., 1997; Wyant, 2008).  However, perceptions of violence may not 
always be valid measures of the levels of violence an area is actually experiencing.  
Future research should incorporate measurements of both perceptions and objective 
values of crime.  When the measures of violence and victimization in the PHDCN data 
have been compared with external measures from official statistics, the results have been 
complementary (Browning, Dietz, and Feinberg, 2004; Morenoff et al., 2001; Sampson et 
al., 1997), but future research would benefit from employing both outcome measures in 
analyses. 
 Fifth, the measurement of gentrification in these neighborhood clusters was 
constructed using data from 1990 and 2000.  Therefore, the rapidity and variation in 
changes was not able to be examined.  Some neighborhoods may have primarily changed 
at the beginning of the decade, thus their responses to the 1994-95 survey are temporally 
accurate to report on these changes.  But some neighborhoods may have started changing 
later in the decade, so their responses to the 1994-95 survey may not thoroughly capture 
their reactions to the process.  Future research may benefit from employing 
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measurements of gentrification that can be captured in smaller time intervals.  
Additionally, future research would benefit from an incorporation of measures that 
capture commercial gentrification.  Recent research has begun to do this, and it would be 
beneficial to future studies to examine both commercial and residential change 
(Papachristos et al., 2011).
25
  
 Finally, there are clear methodological limitations to the displacement analyses, 
making this section of the current study exploratory and its results preliminary.  One 
limitation is the use of neighborhood clusters; displacement effects may occur on a more 
micro-level, with the redevelopment of buildings on one block prompting crime to 
displace to a nearby block that is still within a neighborhood.  Another limitation is the 
use of homicide rates as the outcome.  Homicide is a relatively rare event; therefore, it is 
difficult to discern if changes over these years are meaningful (Pridemore, 2005).  This 
limitation was addressed by incorporating the measurement of perceived violence from 
the 2001-02 community survey, and comparing these results to the 1994-95 results, but 
the 2001-02 survey has a much smaller sample size, compromising its reliability.  Future 
research will benefit from incorporating official statistics of crime across the entire span 
of the gentrification process; in that way, the preliminary conclusions from this project 
may be strengthened by results using more reliable and valid measures. 
Policy Implications  
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 The current study attempted to gather from archival records of businesses entering into the 
neighborhoods in the 1990s, but this collection had to be abandoned.  Since the information about each 
business only listed the name, category (i.e. restaurants, coffee shops, nail salons), and location, it was 




 There are several potential recommendations from this dissertation for those in 
charge of housing policy and urban development.  Since the current study demonstrates 
that gentrification can have crime-reduction benefits if the longtime residents do not feel 
threatened by it, perhaps future policymakers can make efforts to engage them in the 
process.  In this way, longtime residents could feel as if redevelopment was something 
they could benefit from.  Lance Freeman (2006: 325) wrote about gentrification in 
Harlem, and challenged the notion that longtime residents will automatically reject the 
changes.  He writes, “The discourse on gentrification… has tended to overlook the 
possibility that some of the neighborhood changes associated with gentrification might be 
appreciated by the prior residents.”  From a policy perspective, it may be in a city’s best 
interests to encourage active participation in the gentrification process.  We have some 
evidence for this in Chicago; in the Bronzeville area of Chicago redevelopers in the 
1990s worked with community organizations to design new and affordable housing that 
maintained a similar visual profile to the area.  When Chicago’s Planning and 
Development Commissioner (Valerie Jarrett) was interviewed about this in 1992, she 
elaborated about the efforts in Bronzeville: 
“We want to maintain the existing resident base and to build around that 
and integrate with that,” she said. “This will not lead to gentrification. 
One strategy will be to limit new development in both areas to buildings of 
no more than four stories tall. Even more important will be attracting 
middle-class and working-class people back to the areas….What we`re 
trying to do…is to change the mix. We want to try to introduce market-rate 
housing as well as low- and moderate-income housing.” (Reardon, 1992: 
2) 
 Developers could also encourage gentrification efforts that have a goal of 
preserving the neighborhood’s cultural history.  In his accounts of gentrification in 
Harlem, Freeman (2005; 2006) concludes that much of the success was due to the 
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preservation of the rich cultural and historical significance the area holds for African 
Americans.  However, some argue that capitalizing on a neighborhood’s traditional 
image should be done thoughtfully and carefully.  Anderson and Sternberg (2013: 457) 
observe that policymakers and redevelopers should be wary of making neighborhoods 
into sites of “ethnic consumption,” where the culture is exploited for capital gain at the 
expense of making the longtime residents feel caricaturized by new residents and visitors.    
One worry presented by several gentrification scholars is that race and class 
discrimination in mortgage lending and realtor steering will intensify as investment in a 
gentrifying area increases (Turner and Skidmore, 1999; Wyly and Hammel, 2004).  In 
many disadvantaged neighborhoods historically occupied by minorities, such processes 
were the cause of their initially being pushed into these neighborhoods (Kain, 1968; 
William and Collins, 2001).  Now, scholars worry that gentrification will intensify this 
process of spatial segregation (Wyly and Hammel, 2004).  Lees (2008: 2449) offers a 
more extreme description of this, concluding that “[gentrifiers] tend to self-segregate, 
and, far from being tolerant, gentrification is part of an aggressive revanchist ideology 
designed to retake the inner city for the middle classes.”  If policymakers truly wish 
gentrification to result in positive outcomes for neighborhoods, promoting social 
inclusion and participation in the process across all residents may be vital for more 
neighborhoods to enjoy the crime-reduction benefits that gentrification can encourage.  
Perhaps developers could get the input of longtime residents for decisions about 
redesigning public spaces – investment in the process may encourage residents to take 
advantage of the changes and not feel threatened by them.  The current study suggests 
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that attention to such contextual factors may be influential to violence and victimization 
in gentrifying neighborhoods. 
It may also be advantageous for gentrification scholars to examine the emergence 
of housing redevelopment policies which incentivize gentrification efforts, and therefore 
play powerful roles in setting these processes of gentrification motion in neighborhoods 
with high potential.  In the city of Chicago, for example, the late 1980s saw the 
emergence of federally funded affordable housing investments for the first time (Lenz 
and Shaw, 1993).  It could be the case that policymakers play a pivotal role in setting 
gentrification efforts in motion in particular neighborhoods.  Therefore, future research 
should continue to examine the interaction between local policy, investment, and 
redevelopment measures. 
Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
 This dissertation incorporated criminological theory into the study of 
gentrification and perceived violence, suggesting contextual factors in neighborhoods 
which may play a significant role in moderating the relationship between these factors.  
Overall, the results suggested that the level of collective efficacy and perceived 
neighborhood change can each play a role in strengthening or changing the relationship 
between gentrification and perceived violence.  Additionally, there is preliminary 
evidence from this study that perceived violence does not spatially displace to adjacent 
areas when gentrification impacts a neighborhood.  While this project sheds light on 
mechanisms which may play a significant role in the relationship, there is still much more 
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work to be done before we have a thorough understanding of the nuanced ways in which 
gentrification affects perceived violence in neighborhoods.   
 In the past decade, the country has been hit by a significant economic recession, 
which has halted many gentrification and redevelopment projects in their tracks 
(Delmelle and Thill, 2014).  Therefore, an important question to examine is how 
gentrification efforts that were initiated in the economic boom of the 1990s have been 
impacted by this significant hit to economic resources.  It could be the case, for example, 
that abandoned gentrification efforts have harmed neighborhoods by beginning to 
develop sites and leaving them unattended and unfinished, contributing to social 
disorganization.  The rapidly fluctuating economic climate has undoubtedly had an 
impact on gentrification processes throughout the country, and future research should 
consider what happens when gentrification efforts are not able to proceed as planned. 
It will also be important in future research to examine variations in the rapidity of 
gentrification across and within neighborhoods.  This will benefit from examining 
evidence of both commercial and residential changes, and to examine gentrification on a 
smaller scale, tracking changes both at more frequent intervals and across smaller spatial 
units of analysis.  While archival data of business changes in the 1990s in Chicago 
proved unreliable, future research would benefit from gathering contemporary data 
demonstrating the ways in which gentrification impacts the population and the businesses 
in neighborhoods.  It would also be interesting to examine in future research whether 
different types of crime are impacted by commercial versus residential displacement.  
Additionally, gathering data more frequently throughout an area will help to reveal 
whether or not the rapidity of gentrification process causes different interactions with 
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social control or threat mechanisms.  One might speculate that more rapid change in an 
area with elevated perceptions of perceived neighborhood change could cause a more 
significant increase in perceived violence.  Conversely, rapid change in an area of 
collective efficacy may continue to experience crime reduction benefits, but these 
questions must be left for future research to explore. 
It will also be important in future research to examine gentrification processes in 
other urban areas.  The city of Chicago has provided criminologists with a rich dataset to 
examine neighborhood context for several decades, but the examination of gentrification 
and crime should be expanded to other cities.  Several scholars have already begin to do 
this, examining gentrification and crime patterns in Baltimore, Boston, San Francisco, 
Seattle, and New York City to name a few (Atkinson, 2000; Kreager et al., 2011; 
McDonald, 1986; Taylor and Covington, 1988).  However, these studies have not yet 
examined the role of neighborhood contextual factors.  The survey administered through 
the PHDCN has been administered in a few other urban areas (Wickes et al., 2011); 
future research in gentrification and crime should take advantage of these replications and 
gather the appropriate data on gentrification to determine if neighborhood contextual 
factors operate in similar manners as they have in the current study. 
 The final conclusions from this dissertation are modest.  From this research, there 
is evidence to suggest that neighborhood context plays an important role in dictating 
whether gentrification will help to reduce crime, or whether it will make crime worse.  
There is also preliminary evidence suggesting that when gentrification is associated with 
reductions in perceived violence, this criminal activity does not simply move to 
surrounding areas.  As the 21
st
 century progresses, it is likely that many urban areas will 
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undergo gentrification processes.  This dissertation suggests that it will be important in 
such future endeavors to take the time to examine neighborhood context; in this way, 
neighborhoods that experience gentrification can possibly avoid dangerous consequences 


















Appendix A.  Difference-in-Differences Estimation for Logged Homicide Rate, Gentrification 


























1 2.8719 0.6954 -2.1765 2.0328 1.3103 -0.7225 -1.4540 75.7872 35.5425 
2 4.5786 0.7110 -3.8676 4.3005 0.3229 -3.9776 0.1100 84.4713 92.4906 
3 4.7649 0.6907 -4.0742 4.6848 0.2202 -4.4646 0.3904 85.5043 95.2998 
4 3.6724 0.6416 -3.0308 3.7010 0.0201 -3.6809 0.6501 82.5299 99.4574 
5 5.0447 0.2228 -4.8219 5.7602 0.0942 -5.6660 0.8441 95.5837 98.3645 
6 3.0214 0.6487 -2.3727 3.2104 0.4783 -2.7321 0.3594 78.5294 85.1029 
7 4.7299 0.5659 -4.1640 4.8629 0.3015 -4.5614 0.3974 88.0361 93.7993 
8 2.9258 0.7786 -2.1472 2.3836 0.4172 -1.9664 -0.1808 73.3874 82.4957 
9 1.4632 0.1305 -1.3327 1.0390 0.1567 -0.8822 -0.4505 91.0810 84.9147 
10 4.9086 0.6347 -4.2739 4.7225 0.0907 -4.6318 0.3579 87.0706 98.0801 
11 2.1094 0.9440 -1.1654 2.4812 0.1779 -2.3033 1.1379 55.2497 92.8309 
12 4.0623 0.6155 -3.4468 4.2270 0.4620 -3.7651 0.3183 84.8485 89.0710 
13 4.2301 0.2256 -4.0045 4.4809 0.7718 -3.7091 -0.2954 94.6665 82.7759 
14 2.8722 0.9605 -1.9117 2.3686 0.6317 -1.7369 -0.1748 66.5578 73.3293 
15 3.6608 0.5420 -3.1188 3.5986 0.3983 -3.2003 0.0814 85.1959 88.9318 
16 3.2787 0.7969 -2.4818 3.3318 0.1708 -3.1610 0.6793 75.6932 94.8750 
17 2.7276 0.7477 -1.9799 2.5385 0.3881 -2.1504 0.1705 72.5875 84.7117 
18 2.6148 0.5490 -2.0658 2.5526 0.1616 -2.3910 0.3253 79.0025 93.6710 
19 3.5296 0.6469 -2.8827 3.7906 0.1531 -3.6375 0.7548 81.6717 95.9603 
20 1.7589 0.3677 -1.3912 1.3038 0.7805 -0.5233 -0.8679 79.0926 40.1358 
21 2.0307 0.3163 -1.7144 2.9757 0.4080 -2.5676 0.8532 84.4241 86.2876 
22 2.7203 0.6359 -2.0844 2.5295 0.2993 -2.2302 0.1458 76.6228 88.1662 
23 4.1656 0.2342 -3.9314 4.7882 0.7536 -4.0346 0.1032 94.3772 84.2614 
24 3.3798 0.3054 -3.0744 3.8438 0.0164 -3.8273 0.7529 90.9639 99.5724 
25 3.0617 0.7711 -2.2906 3.5844 0.0017 -3.5828 1.2922 74.8149 99.9534 
26 3.4340 0.6377 -2.7963 3.6666 0.8220 -2.8446 0.0484 81.4288 77.5820 
27 3.3318 0.5060 -2.8258 3.0009 0.6085 -2.3923 -0.4335 84.8144 79.7210 
28 3.4318 0.8670 -2.5648 3.9117 0.3495 -3.5622 0.9974 74.7349 91.0654 
29 3.1043 0.2529 -2.8514 3.6533 0.2360 -3.4172 0.5658 91.8539 93.5392 
30 3.8489 0.2099 -3.6390 3.8942 0.7407 -3.1535 -0.4855 94.5461 80.9795 
31 4.2015 0.2763 -3.9252 4.0926 0.4021 -3.6906 -0.2346 93.4234 90.1761 
32 3.0353 0.4483 -2.5870 3.9240 0.0567 -3.8672 1.2802 85.2316 98.5540 
33 0.0003 0.3758 0.3755 0.0012 0.0037 0.0025 0.3730 81.6755 84.7124 
34 3.4431 0.3659 -3.0772 3.7901 0.2634 -3.5267 0.4495 89.3724 93.0507 
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